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PERPETUITIES REFORM IN NORTH






For centuries, an archaic property law doctrine, a relic
from early English common law, has set fear into the hearts of
lawyers everywhere: the Rule Against Perpetuities. From
novice law students to experienced practitioners, there are very
few members of the legal profession who have not failed at
some point in their careers to navigate successfully through
both the labyrinthine workings of the Rule itself and the nu-
merous legal fictions, such as the "fertile Octogenarian" and
the "precocious toddler," that the Rule has spawned. Re-
cently, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted sweep-
ing legislation designed to simplify North Carolina
perpetuities practice. In this Article, Professor Link (the chair
of the Trusts Drafting Committee appointed by the General
Statutes Commission) and Ms. Licata take a first look at the
new perpetuities legislation. The Article first explains the pro-
visions of the new legislation, drawing the reader's attention to
the areas in which the impact of the legislation will be the
greatest. Next, the authors examine recent North Carolina
perpetuities cases, and explain how the new legislation will
greatly simplify the somewhat convoluted perpetuities doctrine
that has come out of the North Carolina courts in recent years.
Finally, the Article ends with a helpful "Primer for the Practi-
tioner," highlighting the aspects of the new'legislation that will
be of greatest interest to North Carolina property lawyers.
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The Rule Against Perpetuities is a deceptively simple statement,
difficult in its application: "No interest is good, unless it must vest, if
at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest."1 The complexities of the Rule have resulted
in its reputation as "a technicality-ridden legal nightmare" and a
"dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of the
bar."2 John Chipman Gray once wrote:
There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate
error. Perhaps it is because of the mode of reasoning unlike
that with which lawyers are most familiar. The study and
practice of the Rule Against Perpetuities is indeed a constant
school of modesty. A long list might be formed of the de-
monstrable blunders with regard to its questions made by
1. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland
Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942).




eminent men, blunders which they themselves have been
sometimes the first to acknowledge; and there are few law-
yers of any practice in drawing wills and settlements who
have not at some time either fallen into the net which the
Rule spreads for the unwary, or at least shuddered to think
how narrowly they have escaped it.
3
The history of the application of the Rule in North Carolina cases
has demonstrated the truth of this observation. The ideas encapsu-
lated in almost every word of Gray's classic statement of the Rule
have been the subject of extensive litigation in North Carolina, lead-
ing to a variety of confusing applications and uncertain results.4 For
example, the most prominent recent North Carolina Supreme Court
perpetuities decision, Joyner v. Duncan, sustained an interest that
clearly violated the Rule. Other recent cases have struggled with the
Rule, especially as it applies to class gifts and as it relates to rules of
construction.6
Joining a national movement toward enactment of the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities ("USRAP"),7 and no doubt
spurred by continuing litigation over perpetuities-related issues, the
North Carolina General Assembly in its 1995 session enacted three
bills to address the pitfalls of the common law: Senate Bill 83 (a Bill
to enact the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities); Senate
Bill 84 (a Bill to Enact Time Limits on Options in Gross and Other
Interests in Land);9 and Senate Bill 85 (a Bill to Provide for Honorary
Trusts, Trusts for Pets, and Trusts for Cemetery Lots). 10 These were
three of the eight trusts and estates bills recommended by the General
Statutes Commission for the 1995 legislative year. All eight trusts and
estates bills recommended by the Commission were enacted by the
General Assembly.'
3. GRAY, supra note 1, at xi.
4. For a discussion of North Carolina cases up to 1979, see Ronald C. Link, The Rule
Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57 N.C. L. REV. 727 (1979). Cases decided after
1979 are discussed infra at notes 144-88, 194-232.
5. 299 N.C. 565, 264 S.E.2d 76 (1980); see also infra notes 144-55 and accompanying
text.
6. See infra notes 156-232 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text for discussion.
8. Senate Bill 83, Act of June 7, 1995, ch. 190, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pamphlet
3 at 152 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 to -22 (Supp. 1995)).
9. Senate Bill 84, Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 525, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pamphlet
5 at 686 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-28 to -33 (Supp. 1995)).
10. Senate Bill 85, Act of June 13, 1995, ch. 225, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pamphlet
3 at 245 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-145 to -148, 65-9 (1995)).
11. The other bills were: Senate Bill 82, Act of Oct. 1, 1995, ch. 262, 1995 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv., Pamphlet 3 at 378 (amending scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 28A,
1996] 1785
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Senate Bills 83, 84, and 85 significantly improve the laws of North
Carolina. They retain the basic policy behind the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, but will have four particularly beneficial additional effects:
First, they will simplify a complex area of the law by applying clear
rules and time periods where previous law required too much guess-
work.'" Second, they will reduce malpractice litigation while helping a
less-than-perfect attorney to effectuate his client's intention with
greater certainty.13 Third, they will serve to clarify land titles, since
valid and invalid interests will be more identifiable.' 4 Fourth, they will
reduce litigation in the areas of estate planning and real property
law.
15
This Article begins by reviewing some of the problems associated
with thie common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. It then analyzes the
1995 legislation, explains how it would apply to recent North Carolina
cases on perpetuities, 16 and concludes with some advice for the practi-
tioner. Trusts and estates lawyers will be particularly interested in the
bills on perpetuities (Senate Bill 83) and honorary trusts (Senate Bill
85). Real property practitioners should note the new time limits on
nondonative transfers in Senate Bill 84.
30); Senate Bill 244, Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 294, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pamphlet 3
at 455 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-28-1 to -7 (1995)); Senate Bill 320, Act of July
26, 1995, ch. 486, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pamphlet 5 at 203 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 33B-1 to -22, 32A-1 (1995)); Senate Bill 707, Act of June 5, 1995, ch. 161, 1995
N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pamphlet 3 at 83 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5(a) (Supp.
1995)); Senate Bill 724, Act of June 27, 1995, ch. 724, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., Pam-
phlet 4 at 118 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-1 to -2, 32A-14.1 to -14.12 (Supp.
1995)).
The bills were introduced in the Senate by Commission member Fletcher M. Hartsell,
who did an exceptionally able job in shepherding the bills through the General Assembly.
All of the bills were first proposed to the Commission by its Trusts Drafting Commit-
tee, composed of James M. Gregg of Winston-Salem, JoAnn T. Harilee of Greensboro,
James B. McLaughlin, Jr., of Buies Creek, Charles J. Murray of Raleigh, and Ronald C.
Link of Chapel Hill, Chair. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Trusts Drafting Committee.
12. See infra notes 28-43 and accompanying text for discussion.
13. See infra note 41 and accompanying text for discussion.
14. Memorandum from the Trusts Drafting Committee to the General Statutes Com-
mission 7 [hereinafter Memorandum] (on file with the authors).
15. Id.
16. This article surveys the cases from 1979 to the present. For a discussion of cases up
to 1979, see Link, supra note 4, at 738-817.
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I. THE COMMON-LAw RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule against remoteness of
vesting, distinguishing between types of future interests, 7 between
vested and contingent interests, and between vesting in interest and
vesting in enjoyment. The Rule may apply to class gifts, charitable
gifts, powers of appointment, and interests created by the exercise of a
power of appointment. The measuring period is lives in being'8 at the
creation of the interest, plus twenty-one years1 9 The validity of future
interests governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities is judged at the
time of their creation.2" Traditional perpetuities analysis turns on
17. For perpetuities purposes, the principal distinction is between future interests left
in the transferor (reversions, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry), which are re-
garded as presently vested and therefore not subject to the Rule, and future interests in
transferees (remainders and executory interests), which are potentially subject to the Rule.
See Link, supra note 4, at 753-54. Further, among interests in transferees there is an impor-
tant distinction between remainders, which must vest in interest within the period of the
Rule, and executory interests, which must vest in possession within the period of the Rule.
Id. at 761-62.
18. There is no simple formula for determining lives in being; they are those persons
who can affect vesting in possession (such as a life tenant) and those persons who can affect
vesting in interest (such as beneficiaries, persons who can affect the identity of the benefi-
ciaries [such as parents], and persons who can affect a condition precedent to vesting). See
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 300-01 (3d ed. 1993). For a case illus-
trating the identification of measuring lives, see Pittman v. Thomas, 58 N.C. App. 336,339-
40, 293 S.E.2d 695, 698-99, rev'd, 307 N.C. 485, 299 S.E.2d 207 (1982) (involving a ho-
lographic will provision for the payment of educational expenses for the testator's
grandchildren, which was acceptable under the Rule since their parents, children of the
testator, must be born within the testator's life and serve as measuring lives). See also
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.2 (1983) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (discussing the determination of measuring lives); Jesse Dukeminier, A
Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1872 (1986) [hereinafter Dukeminier,
Modern Guide] (identifying issues with measuring lives); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities:
The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1654-59 (1985) [hereinafter Dukeminier,
Measuring Lives] (identifying measuring lives as those lives in a causal relation to vesting).
19. The evolution of the twenty-one year time period of the Rule Against Perpetuities
began with Lord Nottingham's opinion in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931
(Ch. 1682). Lord Nottingham's opinion stated that the Rule was not restricted to lives in
being, but it failed to indicate the outer limits of the Rule. Id. at 955, 960. In Stephens v.
Stephens, 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (Ch. 1736), the period of actual minority of a beneficiary was
held to be an acceptable addition to the duration of lives in being. By the time Cadell v.
Palmer, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833), was decided, the twenty-one year period was avail-
able to be added to lives in being as a period in gross regardless of the minority of a
beneficiary. For a description of the evolution of the twenty-one year period, see Lord
Chancellor's opinion in Cole v. Sewell, 9 Eng. Rep 1062 (H.L. 1848). Early on, the courts
recognized that additional periods of gestation were necessary to preserve the testator's
intentions where conceived, yet unborn children were involved. In Cadell, the court lim-
ited this rule to the period of gestation of an actual person, thus preventing the addition of
nine or ten months in gross to every twenty-one year period.
20. In the case of interests created by a deed, the period of perpetuities begins to run
on the date the deed is delivered. See LEwis M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
what might happen-even on the most fanciful of assumptions.2" One
does not wait-and-see whether the interest vests in time. Further, if
the interest is bad, it fails; there is no reformation to achieve validity.
The Rule Against Perpetuities initially served as a limit on future
interests in family wealth transfers, such as wills and trusts,22 but it has
sometimes been applied to nondonative transfers, such as options to
purchase, preemptive rights, and leases to commence in the future.23
The Rule is distinct from but related to the rule against restraints on
alienation, since remote future interests indirectly restrain alienation,
but our courts have had difficulty keeping the two doctrines separate.
In Smith v. Mitchell,24 the North Carolina Supreme Court appeared to
say that the time limit for the validity of a preemption challenged as
an unreasonable restraint on alienation was the period of the related
Rule Against Perpetuities.2 5 Nevertheless, a decade later in Village of
Pinehurst v. Regional Investments,26 the court seemed to invalidate a
preemption purely on perpetuities grounds, not as a restraint on alien-
ation. At the same time, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
sometimes saved land contracts from invalidation under either perpe-
FUTURE ImTREmSTS § 1226 (2d ed. 1956) (setting out the rules for determining the time
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities). A will takes effect upon the testator's death. See
Joyner v. Duncan, 299 N.C. 565,569, 264 S.E.2d 76,81 (1980). Irrevocable trusts are mea-
sured from the date of creation, W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L.
REv. 638, 642 (1938), but revocable trusts are measured from the settlor's death since
control of the property is not given up prior to that date. See Cook v. Horn, 104 S.E.2d
461, 464 (Ga. 1958); SIMES & SMITH, supra, § 1226.
21. This has led to the creation of such notable doctrines as the "fertile octogenarian"
doctrine, which presumes a couple is fertile until death despite any medical evidence to the
contrary; the "unborn widow" doctrine, which presumes that a 45-year-old life benefici-
ary's spouse might die and the life beneficiary might remarry a person who was unborn at
the testator's death and then produce offspring; the "precocious toddler" doctrine, which
presumes that a child of less than five years is capable of producing children; and the
"administration contingency" doctrine, which presumes that administration of an estate or
probate of a will or other event will not occur in due course but may take more than 21
years. For a discussion of these anomalous rules, see Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra
note 18, at 1876-80; Link, supra note 4, at 762-65; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Re-
form, 81 MicH. L. Rv. 1718, 1728-50 (1983).
22. In 1620, the English case of Pells v. Brown, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620), held that
executory interests were not subject to the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remain-
ders. This holding probably made the evolution of something like the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities inevitable, as a control on executory interests. See Link, supra note 4, at 733-34.
The Rule now extends to remainders, equitable interests, interests in personalty, and per-
haps to nondonative transfers.
23. See Link, supra note 4, at 804-17 (discussing the applicability of the Rule to com-
mercial transactions).
24. 301 N.C. 58, 269 S.E.2d 608 (1980).
25. Id. at 66, 269 S.E.2d at 613.




tuities or restraints on alienation doctrines (with the supreme court
subsequently denying review) by reasoning that the parties must have
contemplated a reasonable time for performance, which would be less
than twenty-one years.27 In all, eighteen recent cases have struggled
with the applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities to nondonative
transfers. The 1995 legislation addresses these issues.
A final related topic addressed by the 1995,legislation is that of
honorary trusts, such as those to provide care of a grave, care of a pet,
or the saying of masses for the repose of a soul. These are sometimes
challenged on perpetuities grounds, but North Carolina case law pro-
vides no guidance in this regard.
II. THE NEW PERPETUITIES STATUTES
A. Sections 41-15 to 41-22: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities ("USRAP")
2 8
This section discusses new North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tions 41-15 through 41-22, which codify the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities ("USRAP").2 9 The USRAP was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1986 and by the American Bar Association, on the unanimous recom-
mendation of the Council of the ABA Section on Real Property, Pro-
bate and Trust Law, in 1987.30 It has been unanimously endorsed by
the Board of Regents of the American College of Probate Counsel
(now the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel), the Board
of Governors of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, and
the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)."
The USRAP has been adopted in twenty-four states, including Cali-
27. See infra text accompanying notes 195-215.
28. Despite the predictability which the USRAP brings to the law, one aspect remains
puzzling-its pronunciation. Both "use-rap" and "us-rap" seem acceptable to its drafter
and advocates.
29. The USRAP drafters prepared an extensive and valuable set of official comments
to accompany the USRAP. Typically, the official comments to Uniform Acts are not re-
printed in the Michie Company's codification of the North Carolina General Statutes.
Nevertheless, the Trusts Drafting Committee thought it was especially important to include
the official comments to the USRAP in the General Statutes and therefore included in
Senate Bill 83 a section authorizing the Revisor of Statutes to cause to be printed with the
USRAP all portions of the comments as the Reporter deemed appropriate. The official
comments have been printed with the Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15 cmt. (Supp. 1995).
The authors recommend these comments to the reader. This article places the USRAP in
North Carolina perspective and highlights major issues that might not be immediately ap-
parent to the reader.
30. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 3.
31. See id.
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fornia, Massachusetts, and nearby states Florida, Georgia, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
32
The USRAP embodies three principles. First, interests that are
valid under the common-law Rule remain valid. In other words, the
validating side of the common-law Rule is preserved, and in this re-
gard the USRAP works no change in North Carolina law. Thus,
knowledgeable attorneys can continue to follow standard drafting
practices.
Second, if an interest is not valid under the common-law Rule, it
is allowed up to ninety years in which to vest. This principle of the
USRAP is known as the wait-and-see doctrine, first proposed by Pro-
fessor W. Barton Leach as a means of judging perpetuities from ac-
tual, not possible, events.3 3 It is highly likely that most interests which
would violate the Rule in theory will in fact vest or fail within the
32. See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 185, 187 n.8 (1995) [hereinafter Dukeminier, New Perils].
The USRAP was drafted by Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner of the University of
Michigan Law School, whose work continues to have a profound impact in reforming the
law of donative transfers. Professor Waggoner was also Reporter for the 1990 revised Arti-
cle II of the Uniform Probate Code and is Reporter for the new project to prepare the
Third Restatement of the Law of Property (Donative Transfers). Law professors, who
rarely agree on anything, are in near-unanimous support of the USRAP. There are, how-
ever, respected property scholars who criticize it. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, Perpetuities
Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REv. 23 (1987); Dukeminier, New Perils,
supra; Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1023 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Ninety Years]. For a
trenchant review of the criticisms of the USRAP, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATFS 886-99 (5th ed. 1995).
In 1988, Professor Paul G. Haskell of the University of North Carolina proposed a
more limited approach than the USRAP, but one which addressed many of the unneces-
sary complexities of the Rule: adoption of vesting in possession within a specific number of
years. Professor Haskell suggested that this period should be 125 years, although he was
amenable to 110 or even 100 years, and also favored provisions for a power of sale by
operation of law when the power does not otherwise exist. Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal
for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REv. 545 (1988).
Other references on the USRAP include: Mary Louise Fellows, Testing Perpetuity
Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity Cases 1984-89,25 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991);
Amy M6rris Hess, Freeing Property Owners from the RAP Trap: Tennessee Adopts the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 TENN. L. REv. 267 (1995); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year
Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 157 (1988); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986); Raymond
H. Young, USRAP to the Rescue. Taming the Rule Against Perpetuities, 73 MASS. L. REv.
126 (1988); John D. Moore, Note, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Taming
the "Technicality-Ridden Legal Nightmare," 95 W. VA. L. REv. 193 (1992).
33. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Ter-
ror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 730 (1952).
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perpetuities period if allowed to do so.34 The period of ninety years
was selected for two reasons. First, it is a reasonable approximation of
the period of lives in being plus twenty-one years and is much easier
to apply." Second, it avoids the random variations that result from
case-by-case determinations of measuring lives.36 The use of a period
of ninety years in essence ensures that no lawyer will be held liable for
a perpetuities violation within the lawyer's lifetime, since few people
will live a hundred years.37 While the desirability of the wait-and-see
doctrine has been debated among scholars, wait-and-see is preferable
to traditional reliance on potential events and obscure theories deny-
ing otherwise acceptable dispositions of property.38 Although North
Carolina has not previously embraced the wait-and-see doctrine,39 it
represents the majority view in the United States.40
Third, if an interest does not vest in time, the court is directed to
reform it in the manner that most closely approximates the trans-
feror's intention and is within the ninety-year period.4" Not only will
this provision substantially fulfill the transferor's intention, it will also
reduce the risks of malpractice litigation in a very difficult area of the
law. The concept of reformation for perpetuities violations has ex-
34. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15 cmt. A (Supp, 1995) ("It is generally recognized that
the invalidating side of the [c]ommon-law Rule is harsh because it can invalidate interests
on the ground of possible post-creation events that are extremely unlikely to happen and
that in actuality almost never do happen, if ever.").
35. Ninety years was selected as a reasonable approximation of the period of time
produced using a set of actual measuring lives plus twenty-one years. According to a statis-
tical study reported in Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress Report on the
Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 20 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 700 (1986), the
youngest measuring life tends to be age six. Id. 704. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, the remaining life expectancy of a six-year-old is 69.6 years. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986 at 69 tbl. 108 (1986). The
drafters of the USRAP chose to use sixty-nine years, which when added to twenty-one
years makes a total of ninety years. See UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETU-
ITEs, Prefatory Note (1986).
36. See generally Dukeminier, Measuring Lives, supra note 18 (discussing the uncer-
tainty created by using measuring lives in the context of wait-and-see reforms).
37. See Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra note 18, at 1885.
38. For a summary of the criticisms of the wait-and-see doctrine, see id. at 1880-87;
Waggoner, supra note 21, at 1759-82.
39. See Peele v. Wilson County Bd. of Educ., 56 N.C. App. 555, 560, 289 S.E.2d 890,
893, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 386, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982); Joyner v. Duncan, 299 N.C.
565, 581-82, 264 S.E.2d 76, 88-89 (1980).
40. In addition to the 24 USRAP states, four states have judicial authorization and
four others have non-USRAP statutes incorporating the wait-and-see doctrine. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 41-19(b) cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, §§ 1.1-1.6 (approving of
the use of the wait-and-see doctrine).
41. The power to reform is sometimes called cy pres, after the cy pres doctrine avail-
able for gifts to charity. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES
IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 218 (2d ed. 1984).
1996] 1791
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isted in some form, legislative or judicial, in a handful of states to pre-
serve the purposes of the Rule by altering the gift in violation.42 An
easy method of reformation would be for a court to ensure that all
interests vest within ninety years, in effect adding a savings clause to
any questionable disposition.43
One criticism of the USRAP has been that reformation at the end
of ninety years (in contrast to reformation at the beginning when a
violation of the common-law Rule appears) will be the occasion of a
grand lawsuit, from which the attorneys involved will profit more than
any of the parties. For example, 0 transfers Blackacre to A and his
heirs so long as Blackacre is used for a farm, then to B and her heirs.44
Under the common-law Rule, the executory interest in B would be
remote, and any reformation would probably be made near the time
of O's transfer. Under the USRAP, one would wait up to ninety years
to see whether the property ceased to be used for a farm. If at the end
of ninety years the property were still being used as a farm, the trans-
fer would be reformed. The alternatives would include the following:
(1) give A (or A's successors) a fee simple absolute; (2) give B (or B's
successors) a fee simple absolute; (3) give 0 (or O's successors) a fee
simple absolute; or (4) give A a fee simple determinable with a possi-
bility of reverter in 0 (or O's successors).
For many of these cases, the perpetuities reforms have eliminated
the constructional problem by providing a statutory answer.45 An-
other answer to the criticism is that judicial reformation is preferable
to no reformation at all, and that ninety years wait-and-see is prefera-
ble to common-law invalidity ab initio. Finally, a practical answer to
the lawsuit criticism is suggested by a question raised in the Trusts
Drafting Committee: Who will challenge a gift at the end of ninety
years? In contrast to the common-law Rule, which gives an immedi-
ate incentive to challenge possible violations, it is likely that after
ninety years no one will realize the possibility of cy pres. Further, the
outcome of cy pres is less predictable than the typical common-law
result of striking an invalid gift, thus creating another comparative dis-
incentive to suit.
Other illustrations of the operation of the USRAP may be help-
ful. For example, grantors often use age contingencies in their disposi-
42. See Waggoner, supra note 21, at 1755 (listing the states empowering their courts to
reform perpetuities violations).
43. Id. at 1756-59.
44. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 18, at 322, especially problem (b).
45. Under new section 41-32, B's executory interest would be given sixty years in
which to vest, and if it did not vest within sixty years the bill provides that A's interest
would ripen into a fee simple absolute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32(a) (Supp. 1995).
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tions, believing that some people will make better or more productive
use of property if the gift is postponed until the donee is older, as in
the case where 0 bequeaths a fund of $100,000 in trust for A for life,
then in trust for A's children who shall reach the age of thirty. Under
common-law the gift to A's children would violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities. First, A may have a child immediately preceding his
death who consequently cannot reach the age of thirty within twenty-
one years of A's death. The gift to this possible child is remote. Sec-
ond, the gift is a class gift, which must stand or fall as a unit. The
interests of A's children living at O's death, considered alone, are
good-they will take, if at all, within their own lives. But they will
lose their interests because of the potential birth of another sibling.
Under the USRAP, such a gift would be given ninety years to vest,
giving the children of 0 adequate time either to reach age thirty and
receive a share of the gift or die before reaching age thirty and lose
any property interest in the gift.
Similarly, gifts over to grandchildren and great-grandchildren will
be spared immediate invalidation under the USRAP. Grantors often
want to make gifts to grandchildren or great-grandchildren of their
own or of collateral family members. Since the groups of grandchil-
dren and of great-grandchildren are likely to increase either before or
after the grantor's death, the grantor is likely to use class designations
for any gifts involving the grandchildren or the great-grandchildren.
For example, if 0 bequeaths a fund in trust for A for life, then in trust
for A's children for life, then to pay the principal to A's grandchil-
dren, the gift to A's grandchildren would violate the common-law
Rule, since A might have a child who was not a life in being at O's
death. Under the USRAP, the gift to A's grandchildren would be
given ninety years to vest and would likely do so. Similarly, gifts to
the testator's great-grandchildren have often fallen to the perpetuities
axe because no one person alive at the testator's death serves as a
validating life for every possible member of the class. It is possible for
a grandchild to be born after the testator's death and produce a child,
the testator's great-grandchild, well beyond the period of perpetuities.
Under the USRAP, such a disposition would be given ninety years in
which to vest. Most, if not all, great-grandchildren will be born within
this time frame. However, if the beneficiaries are not all born within
this period of time, a court could reform the will to provide a benefit
to each of the testator's great-grandchildren born within that ninety-
year period, thus effectuating the testator's intent to benefit these
people without allowing interests to vest too remotely.
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Powers Of Appointment
With the three general principles of the USRAP in mind, the au-
thors now will examine some of the statutory details. The USRAP
treatment of powers of appointment is consistent with its general prin-
ciples.46 If the power or the interest created by the exercise of the
power is valid under the common-law Rule, it is valid under the US-
RAP, leaving the validating side of the common-law Rule unchanged.
Thus, one first examines the validity of the power itself. General,
presently exercisable powers are valid.47 General powers subject to a
condition precedent are valid if the condition is certain to be satisfied
or not within the period of the common-law Rule.48 That is, if the
general power is certain to be acquired or not within the period of the
Rule, it is valid. Once the power is acquired, the property subject to
the power is no longer tied up, since the donee may appoint it freely.49
Nongeneral powers (formerly knowr as special powers) are valid if
they are certain to be exercised or not within the period of the com-
mon-law Rule.5" The clock starts when the donor creates the power,
since he has tied up the property by confining it to a limited group. 1
General testamentary powers are treated like special powers,5 since
the donee cannot benefit herself during her lifetime and will probably
appoint to her family, a limited group.53 This delineation of powers
resolves a point that was not clear under former North Carolina law.54
If the general or special power itself is not valid under the com-
mon-law Rule, it is held in abeyance and allowed up to ninety years in
which to become valid, either by satisfaction or failure of the condi-
tion precedent in the case of a general power,5 5 or by exercise or ter-
mination of the nongeneral power or testamentary power. 6 If the
power does not become valid within ninety years, the court may re-
form it.57
46. Id § 41-15 cmt. D (Supp. 1995). A general power is one that is exercisable in favor
of the donee of the power, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the
donee's estate. Id. Powers that do not fall in this category are "nongeneral." Id.
47. Id.
48. See iL § 41-15(b)(1).
49. See Link, supra note 4, at 785.
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15(c)(1) (Supp. 1995).
51. See Link, supra note 4, at 784.
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15(c)(1) (Supp. 1995).
53. See Link, supra note 4, at 785-86.
54. See id. at 786-93.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).
56. Id § 41-15(c)(2) & cmt. E.
57. Id. § 41-17(1).
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Next, one examines the validity of any interests created by the
exercise of the powers. For interests created by the exercise of gen-
eral presently exercisable powers, the validity of the interests is mea-
sured from the time of the exercise of the power, 8 since the donee was
in substance the owner of the property subject to the power.59 For
interests created by the exercise of nongeneral powers and testamen-
tary powers, the validity of the interests is measured from the time of
creation of the power,6" since the donor has controlled the disposition
and the donee resembles his agent.6' Utilizing these principles, if the
interests are valid under the common-law Rule, they are valid under
the USRAP.6a If the interests violate the common-law Rule, they are
allowed up to ninety years from creation to actually vest or termi-
nate.63 If they do not actually vest or terminate in time, they may be
judicially reformed, 64 although the reformation section does not ex-
pressly refer to interests created by the exercise of powers.65
In determining the validity of interests created by the exercise of
nongeneral or testamentary powers, some common-law jurisdictions
followed the "second-look doctrine," which allowed one to take into
account facts existing on the date of exercise. This is a limited kind of
wait-and-see doctrine, and the broader USRAP principle subsumes
but does not totally supersede it.66 Prior North Carolina law did not
clearly recognize the second-look doctrine,67 so it is useful to have the
broader USRAP reformation principle as a fail-safe.
Further to the issue of time of creation, the USRAP includes a
subsection providing that nonvested property interests and powers
arising out of a transfer to a previously funded trust are considered to
have been created when the original contribution was made.68 In
other words, when subsequent transfers are made to an existing irrev-
ocable trust, the clock runs on all the transfers from the date of crea-
tion of the trust. This rule is justified on the ground of administrative
58. Id. §§ 41-15 cmt. F, 41-16(a), (b) & cmt.
59. See Link, supra note 4, at 788.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 cmt. F, 41-16(a), (b) & cmt. (Supp. 1995).
61. See Link, supra note 4, at 788.
62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
63. Id. § 41-15(b).
64. Id. § 41-15 cmt. F.
65. It does refer to "power[s] of appointment" and to "nonvested property inter-
est[s]," which presumably includes nonvested interests created by the exercise of powers.
Id §§ 41-17(1), (3).
66. Id § 41-15 cmt. F.
67. See Link, supra note 4, at 789.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-16(c) (Supp.'1995).
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simplicity.69 At first blush it seems harsh, but USRAP wait-and-see
and judicial reformation will moderate its effects.7 °
Construction to Avoid Invalidity
It is generally accepted in other states that where an interest is
susceptible to alternate constructions, one of which would violate the
common-law Rule and the other of which would not violate the Rule,
there is a constructional preference for validity, on the theory that the
transferor must have intended a valid disposition.? The status of this
constructional preference in North Carolina is not clear, with some
cases clearly accepting it,72 some ignoring it,73 and some expressly re-
jecting it.74 Even if the doctrine is rejected, the USRAP will moderate
its harshness since even if the construction which violates the com-
mon-law Rule is chosen, ninety-year wait-and-see plus judicial refor-
mation will be available for the invalid interest.75
Judicial Retrospective Reformation
The USRAP supersedes the common-law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities,76 and applies to all nonvested property interests and powers of
appointment created after its effective date.77 In addition, an impor-
tant subsection extends the judicial reformation power to nonvested
property interests and powers of appointment created before the ef-
fective date of the Act.78 This is a significant feature of the USRAP,
particularly for fiduciary litigators. Note, too, that retroactive refor-
mation is now available for remote powers of appointment or interests
created by their exercise. The guiding limit for retroactive reforma-
tion is the common-law lives in being plus twenty-one years, not the
USRAP ninety years.79 The Comment urges courts to apply the
power by judicially inserting a saving clause, since a saving clause
69. Id. § 41-16(c) cmt.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 41-15 cmt. H.
72. See Link, supra note 4, at 765-67.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15 cmt. H (Supp. 1995).
76. Id. § 41-22.
77. Id. § 41-19(a).
78. Id. § 41-19(b). In a separate statement, the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform
Probate Code has addressed the validity of retroactive application of default rules. See
Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, Joint Editorial Board Statement Re-
garding the Constitutionality of Changes in Default Rules as Applied to Pre-Existing Docu-
ments, 17 ACTEC NoTEs 184, 184-85 (1991).
79. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-19(b) (Supp. 1995).
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probably would have been used if the instrument had been drafted
competently.8 0
Duration of Trusts
Traditionally, the common-law Rule has been interpreted as a
rule against remoteness of vesting, not against interests that last too
long." In other words, if interests vest in time, there is no limit on
trust duration under the common-law Rule.' North Carolina law on
this point has wavered, but apparently the view is that trusts may last
beyond the period of the Rule, provided their interests have vested in
time. 3 Careful drafters, however, should limit trust duration to the
period of the Rule. It is generally accepted elsewhere that a trust can-
not remain indestructible beyond the period of the Rule.' In these
jurisdictions, the USRAP Comment opines that USRAP courts can be
expected to allow the trust beneficiaries to terminate trusts containing
remote interests after ninety years.85 Even if North Carolina takes the
view that neither the common-law Rule nor the USRAP limits trust
duration, the USRAP will be important. If the trust lasts too long, the
trustee's powers to distribute income or principal may be attacked as
remotely exercisable powers of appointment.8 6 Even the trustee's ad-
ministrative powers may be in jeopardy.8 7 Careful drafters will con-
tinue to limit trust duration to the period of the Rule (and are allowed
to continue to use the common-law period under the first principle of
the USRAP). Careless drafters will be helped by the exclusions from
the USRAP of administrative powers in a fiduciary88 and of discre-
tionary powers of a trustee to distribute principal to a beneficiary hav-
ing a vested interest in income and principal.8 9 However, the USRAP
does not exclude discretionary powers over income or discretionary
powers over principal for the benefit of beneficiaries who lack a
vested interest in the income and principal. These powers therefore
will be subject to successful attack as remotely exercisable special
powers, leading then to judicial reformation. 0
80. Id § 41-19(b) cmt.
81. See Link, supra note 4, at 793.
82. See id. at 793-804.
83. See id.
84. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15 crnt. H (Supp. 1995).
85. Id.
86. See Link, supra note 4, at 804.
87. Id.
88. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(2) (Supp. 1995).
89. See id § 41-18(4).
90. See id § 41-15 cmt. E.
1996] 1797
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Saving Clauses
A common question asked by estate planners is whether they
should use saving clauses designed for the common-law Rule, the US-
RAP ninety-year period, or a new saving clause terminating interests
at the later of (a) the common-law period or (b) ninety years. This
question is discussed in the USRAP Comments. The commentators
argue that it is preferable to continue to use a common-law clause,
since the lives in being are tailored to the precise family situation.91 A
saving clause using a ninety-year period is acceptable, and has the vir-
tue of simplicity.92 However, drafters should be wary of using a
"later-of' clause,93 because that clause may not cure a perpetuities
violation and could actually create a violation.94 A ninety-year period
may be longer than the period of time produced by perpetuities analy-
sis under the common-law Rule, thus such interests would not be valid
under the common-law prong of the USRAP. Under the wait-and-see
prong of the USRAP, such clauses improperly use the ninety-year pe-
riod as a minimum time for vesting.9 These problems are not elimi-
nated under subsection (e) of the USRAP, which in effect converts a
"later-of" clause into a traditional saving clause under which all inter-
ests must vest within twenty-one years after the death of the survivor
of specified lives in being. 6
Dynasty Trusts
Alert estate planners may have noted the "dynasty trust" pos-
sibilities available under the USRAP. For example, a grantor or testa-
tor may create a trust "to pay the income to my descendants per
stirpes from time to time living for ninety years, and then to pay the
principal to my descendants then living per stirpes. ' ' 97 Professor Jesse
Dukeminier of the University of California at Los Angeles opines that
it is likely to become popular with millionaires, because up to $1 mil-
lion per transferor, or $2 million per married couple, can be trans-
91. Id § 41-15 cmt. G.
92. See id.
93. An example of a "later-of" clause is: "Any interest under this instrument must
vest not later than the later of (1) twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of my
heirs alive at my death or (2) ninety years after the creation of this trust." Part (1) sets
termination at the perpetuities period under the common law Rule, while part (2) sets it at
a fixed period of ninety years. See id. (giving other examples of "later-of" clauses).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. § 41-15(e).
97. See DtEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 18, at 322 problem (d). Other bells and
whistles are possible; for example, the beneficiaries could be given nongeneral powers of
appointment. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 897-99.
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ferred into a dynasty trust and be exempt from federal estate tax and
generation-skipping transfer tax for the entire duration.98 Appar-
ently, financial planners already have begun to market these ninety-
year trusts in USRAP jurisdictions. 99 The same dynasty trust would
be available under the common-law Rule, except that the duration
would need to be the traditional lives in being plus twenty-one years.
By astute selection of measuring lives, for example the classic "twelve
healthy babies,"100 a common-law testator easily could ensure at least
a ninety-year term for the trust. Nevertheless, the possible psycholog-
ical appeal of the certainty of ninety years may lead to increased use
of dynasty trusts.101
Nondonative Transfers
Finally, nondonative transfers are exempted from the USRAP.'02
The period of the Rule is designed to provide a fair limit in family
98. See Dukeminier, New Perils, supra note 32, at 205-10. Actually, gift or estate taxes
would not be payable until the principal left the hands of the those who received it at the
end of ninety years, so taxes could be postponed for as long as 130 to 200 years after the
creation of the trust. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 32, at 898. By creating the
dynasty trust during life and directing the trustee to buy insurance on the settlor's life, the
$1 million generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption could be leveraged into $7
million on a fifty-year-old or $5 million on a sixty-year-old. Id. Of course, to avoid a gift
tax the settlor would need to make judicious use of the $600,000 exemption equivalent and
the $10,000 annual exclusion.
99. See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders,
94 MICH. L. REV. 148, 160 (1995) (discussing the interplay between dynasty trusts and the
USRAP).
100. See Leach, supra note 20, at 642 for a description of this tactic.
101. For detailed exploration of dynasty trusts and other tax issues under the USRAP,
see Dukeminier, New Perils, supra note 32, at 205-10.
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(1) (Supp. 1995). The statute contains an instructive
list of exceptions, and the comment includes a useful discussion of the line between dona-
tive and nondonative transfers. Three particular issues deserve mention here:
First, interests arising out of premarital or divorce agreements and the like are not
excluded from the USRAP. Even though given in exchange for consideration, the USRAP
regards these agreements as essentially domestic and therefore subject to the USRAP. Id.
§ 41-18(1)(a) & cmt. A. Second, nonvested interests in a charity or governmental unit are
excluded from the USRAP, "if the nonvested property interest is preceded by an interest"
in another charity or governmental unit. Id. § 41-18(5). This is the well-known exception
for back-to-back charitable gifts.
Professor Paul G. Haskell of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School
of Law has inquired as to the meaning of the USRAP charity-to-charity exception. Inter-
view with Paul J. Haskell, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (April 15, 1996). Suppose that the back-to-back chari-
table gifts are preceded by a life estate in an individual, for example:
O conveys to A for life, then to Charity X, but if Charity X ceases to exist, to
Charity Y.
Is the otherwise remote gift to Charity Y valid under § 41-18(5), since there is no
reference in § 41-18(5) to cases with preceding life estates? In the authors' opinion, § 41-
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dispositions such as wills and trusts, not arm's length commercial
deals.10 3 The concept of remote vesting designed for future interests
does not easily or predictably apply to contract rights created by busi-
ness organizations. 104 The USRAP exemption for nondonative trans-
fers leads to the next part of this Article.
B. Sections 41-28 to 41-33: Time Limits on Options in Gross and
Other Interests in Land
As noted above, 05 the USRAP generally excludes from its cover-
age property interests or arrangements created in nondonative trans-
fers.0 6 Nondonative interests are exempted from the USRAP for two
18(5) applies; it is not expressly limited to present estates to the first charity and the lan-
guage is broad enough to fit the first hypothetical.
On the other hand, Professor Haskell suggests the following case:
O conveys to A and her heirs, but if the property ceases to be used for a farm,
then to Charity X, but if Charity X ceases to exist to Charity Y.
Putting aside the effects of new North Carolina General Statutes §§ 41-28 through 41-
33, see infra notes 105-30 and accompanying text, are the gifts to Charities X and Y pro-
tected by section 41-18(5)? In the authors' opinion, they are not, because the gift to the
first charity is remote. The purpose of the back-to-back charity exemption is to save a
second gift to charity where the first gift to charity is valid, on the theory that if property
may be devoted forever to one charity, it ought to be allowed to be devoted forever to two
charities. We concede, however, that the statutory language does not resolve the issue.
The Restatement (Second) of Property indicates that the charitable gifts in the first hypo-
thetical would be good, but the charitable gifts in the second would be remote. RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 18, § 1.6 cmts. b & d.
Third, nonvested interests in employee benefit plans are excluded from the USRAP.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(6) (Supp. 1995). This is consistent with existing statutory provi-
sion on employee trusts, see id. § 36A-6, as well the USRAP exclusion for arrangements
"not subject to the common-law rule against perpetuities or... excluded by another stat-
ute of this State." Id. § 41-18(7).
103. See Link, supra note 4, at 727-51 (discussing policies underlying the Rule Against
Perpetuities).
104. See id. at 753-54 (identifying the interests subject to the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities in North Carolina).
105. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(1) & cmt. A. (Supp. 1995). The new law also ex-
cludes any commercial agreement relating to interest in oil, gas, or minerals, so as to avoid
interfering with bona fide commercial arrangements in the mineral industries. See id. § 41-
29.
The usage "nondonative" transfers may appear novel to some readers. It translates
more or less to "commercial," and is employed here because it is coming into standard
usage. For example, the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Property, dealing with such
matters as perpetuities, restraints on alienation, powers of appointment and class gifts, was
subtitled "Donative Transfers." A new restatement project to restate the rules of construc-
tion for wills and trusts as well as to survey the entire law of wills, class gifts, and powers of
appointment is similarly subtitled "Donative Transfers." As noted in the Official Com-
ment to the new statute, the line between donative and nondonative transfers defies easy
demarcation, but the essence of "donative" is a family wealth transfer, while "nondona-
tive" connotes a commercial transaction. See id. § 41-18 cmt. A.
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reasons: The first reason is that the measuring period, which is a fair
compromise in wills and trusts between the desires of a testator or
settlor to tie up his or her property forever and the desires of his or
her family to be able to enjoy and consume the property immedi-
ately,10 7 is wholly inappropriate for commercial transactions, where
completely different policies are at work. The second reason is that
the concept of remoteness of vesting is unpredictable and difficult to
apply to commercial interests. For example, if a corporation holds a
presently exercisable option, is the option presently "vested" or does
it "vest" only upon exercise?
Since the USRAP exempts nondonative interests from the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the drafters of the North Carolina perpetuities
reform legislation deemed it best to answer the question of what stan-
dards apply to the duration of these interests. A statutory answer to
this question is particularly desirable in North Carolina, where the
possible applicability of the common-law Rule has been frequently lit-
igated, with unpredictable results.'08 The new nondonative transfer
provisions are based on a uniform act provided by the Joint Editorial
Board for the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), the sponsors of the US-
RAP. 0 g They incorporate features of "reverter acts" enacted in some
states,110 and can fairly be described as the best and most comprehen-
sive solution for nondonative transfers yet enacted by any state."'
107. The common-law period of lives in being plus twenty-one years is often regarded
as a narrow limit, but in fact it is fairly generous. It allows the transferor to provide for
those whom he or she knows (lives in being) and allows twenty-one additional years to
cover the minority of their children.
108. See generally Link, supra note 4, at 804-17 (describing the trials and tribulations
experienced by the North Carolina courts as they sought to apply the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities to new and old situations, winding up with a variety of anomalous results).
109. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 41, art. 3, cmt. (Supp. 1995). The nondonative transfers
act has not yet been approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. It may or may not be presented for approval in the future. The nondonative
transfers draft may have been omitted from the USRAP because of some concern that
inclusion might jeopardize enactment of the basic USRAP. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18
cmt. A (Supp. 1995).
110. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 305/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
111. As with the USRAP, the drafters of the uniform act upon which new §§ 41-28 to
41-33 were based also prepared a draft set of official comments to accompany the act.
Those comments are not widely available, but they are very helpful and almost essential to
an understanding of the act. The Trusts Drafting Committee therefore included in the
legislation a section authorizing the Revisor of Statutes to print comments in the General
Statutes, and the draft official comments have been printed with the Act. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 41, art. 3, crnt. (Supp. 1995).
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In general, the new legislation substitutes a simple thirty-year pe-
riod'1 2 as the governing period for the validity of options in gross,"
3
leases to commence in the future,114 and nonvested easements.1
1 5 If
an option is exercised or a lease commences or the nonvested ease-
ment vests within thirty years, it is valid. If the relevant event does
not occur within thirty years, the commercial interest simply becomes
invalid at that time.
The blanket thirty-year period under the USRAP replaces any
reasonableness inquiry, as well as any perpetuities analysis. Thus, the
compromise of implying a reasonable time for the exercise of an op-
tion when the instrument is silent as to duration" 6 is replaced by the
thirty-year period. Like the virtues of the USRAP in the traditional
wills and trusts setting, this provision saves options and preemptive
rights from early invalidity because of the possibility of exercise be-
yond the perpetuities period and grants parties thirty years in which to
exercise their property rights. This allows parties to wait-and-see if
the option or preemptive right will be used rather than immediately
holding such an interest invalid on the possibility it might not be used.
For possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and executory inter-
ests, the drafters followed a similar approach, except that they chose a
period of sixty years." 7 "Reverter acts" in other states have chosen
periods of thirty, forty, and sixty years as limits on the duration of
ancient reversionary interests."" The UPC draft period was a period
112. The UPC draft bracketed the period of thirty years. (The use of brackets around a
time period is a Uniform Law Commissions convention indicating that the Commissioners
recommend the period but do not feel strongly that state-to-state uniformity is essential.)
The North Carolina drafters retained that period, by analogy to the period of the North
Carolina Marketable Title Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1984). However, the
Marketable Title Act does not automatically terminate the real property interests to which
it applies at the end of thirty years; instead, the Act requires the owner of the interest to re-
record it within thirty years to preserve its validity for another thirty years, and so on. Id.
§ 47B-4(a).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-29 (Supp. 1995).
114. Id. § 41-30.
115. Id. § 41-31.
116. See Rodin v. Merritt, 48 N.C. App. 64, 71, 268 S.E.2d 539, 543-44, disc. review
denied, 301 N.C. 402, 274 S.E.2d 226 (1980), and motion to reconsider denied, 274 S.E.2d
231 (N.C. 1981); infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
117. It should be noted that reversions-the third type of future interest left in a trans-
feror-continue to be regarded as vested and are therefore not subject to the USRAP or
the nondonative transfers bill. See supra note 17.
Section 41-28 of the North Carolina General Statutes, a helpful section not included in
the UPC draft, defines the terms of art referred to in the nondonative transfer provisions.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-28 (Supp. 1995). Additional guidance as to the meaning of these
terms may be found in the comments to the UPC draft. See id., ch. 41, art. 3 cmt.
118. See, eg., William F. Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal
Future Interests, 1972 DUKE L.J. 517, 527-31.
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of thirty years enclosed in brackets, which is the convention used to
indicate that the Uniform Laws Commissioners suggested thirty years
but did not feel strongly that uniformity on the period from state-to-
state was essential. The greater period of sixty years was chosen for
North Carolina because of the traditional significance of reversionary
interests, particularly for charitable gifts. 119 Charitable gifts of land
often retain reversionary interests for the donor, and the drafters
wanted to preserve a fairly long lifetime for these interests, so as not
to discourage charitable gifts.
120
The sixty-year provision will further the free alienability of land.
For example, if A transfers Blackacre to B and his heirs so long as
Blackacre is used as a farm, A retains a possibility of reverter. With-
out the new statute, A's interest would continue forever unaffected by
the Rule Against Perpetuities because of the traditional view that pos-
sibilities of reverter in the grantor are presently vested and therefore
not subject to the Rule.12 1 Such a restriction on land limits the pool of
willing buyers, decreases the value of the land if a market is found,
and makes it extremely difficult to obtain financing with the land as
security, meaning that no improvements will be made to the land.
However, under the new law, A's interest continues sixty years and no
longer. If the property is still being used as a farm at the end of sixty
119. See SIMES & SMIrr, supra note 20, §§ 1279-80.
120. See generally LEwis M. SIrms, The Dead Hand Achieves Immortality: Gifts to
Charities, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 110 (1955) (discussing the disparate
perpetuities treatment given to charitable trusts).
121. See Link, supra note 4, at 754. In contrast, the English view is that possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry (but not reversions) are subject to the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, since they are essentially contingent and tie up the use of land. See DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 18, at 307. The traditional American exemption of possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry from the Rule, while executory interests in third parties are
potentially subject to the Rule, gave an advantage to the drafter who was clever enough to
use two instruments. For example, if a grantor attempted the following conveyance, the
executory interest in C was remote:
A transfers to B and his heirs so long as Blackacre is used for a farm, then to C
and her heirs.
But if the grantor was clever, the desired result could be achieved as follows:
First: A transfers to B and his heirs so long as Blackacre is used for a farm. This
leaves a (valid) possibility of reverter in A.
Second: A transfers his possibility of reverter to C and her heirs. C is regarded as
owning A's (valid) possibility of reverter.
The desired result could also be achieved as follows:
First: A transfers to C and her heirs in fee simple absolute. This gives C a fee
simple absolute.
Second: C transfers to B and his heirs so long as the property is used for a farm.
This leaves a (valid) possibility of reverter in C.
Cf DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 18, at 302 (setting forth as examples failed devises
attempting to accomplish the above transfer).
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years, B owns a fee simple absolute as if there had never been any
restriction on the use of his land.
Rights of entry are treated the same as possibilities of reverter.
For example, if A transfers Blackacre to B and his heirs, but if Black-
acre ceases to be used as a farm, A and his heirs may reenter and
repossess as of A's former estate, A retains a right of entry. The dif-
ference from a possibility of reverter is that the reversion is not auto-
matic; A must reenter for title to revert. At common law, the right of
entry was not subject to the Rule."22 Under new section 41-32, A's
interest is good for sixty years and if at the end of that period no
reentry has been made, B owns in fee simple absolute.'
3
In sum, the new law places a sixty-year limit on possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry that previously were of potentially unlim-
ited duration. There is another aspect of the new legislation that in
effect expands the validity of a different type of future interest in or-
der to give it consistent treatment with possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry. For executory interests, a type of future interest in
transferees, not the transferor, the sixty-year provision may have a
validating effect. For example, if A transfers Blackacre to B and his
heirs so long as Blackacre is used for a farm, then to C and her heirs,
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities the executory inter-
est in C is remote and void ab initio.24 Senate Bill 84, however, vali-
dates the gift to C for sixty years.' 5 If at the end of that period the
property is still being used for a farm, B's interest ripens into a fee
simple absolute. 126
These provisions answer a criticism that has been made of the
USRAP: in a state that has enacted the USRAP and, for example, a
thirty-year reverter act, the limits of the reverter act could be avoided
by creating a remote executory interest, which would be subject to the
USRAP ninety-year wait-and-see, then having the holder of the exec-
utory interest transfer it to the original grantor. In the grantor's
hands, the executory interest would still be good for the USRAP
ninety years, not the reverter act's thirty years. The perpetuities re-
122. See SimEs, supra note 120, at 70.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32 (Supp. 1995).
124. See supra pp. 1792-93.
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32 (Supp. 1995).
126. Senate Bill 84 operates to restrict the duration of some executory interests. For-
merly, executory interests could be created to last longer than sixty years, provided the
drafter was prescient enough to limit the interest to lives in being plus twenty-one years.
Under new section 41-32, such an executory interest would be good only for sixty years,
not for the potentially longer period of lives in being plus twenty-one years. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41-32(a) (Supp. 1995).
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forms eliminate this ploy; reverter interests and executory interests
alike are subject to a statutory sixty-year limit.127
Section 41-32 does not apply to interests in charities and govern-
mental entities that are exempt from the USRAP.128 This codifies the
charity-to-charity exception of the common law, giving a clear answer
to a question which had been discussed in North Carolina cases, but
never squarely adopted. 129 Thus, if A devises Blackacre to First Bap-
tist Church so long as it remains a church, and if First Baptist Church
dissolves, then to the United Way, the new statute would not limit the
executory interest in the United Way to sixty years. Since both gifts
involve charities, the USRAP exempts them from its provisions in an
effort to encourage charitable contributions and to ensure that the tes-
tator's charitable wishes are met.130 If at any time in the future First
Baptist Church were to cease being a church, the United Way would
have the right to Blackacre.
Certainty and simplicity are the greatest successes of the statute
regulating options in gross and other similar interests. Any interest
falling within the statutory definition is subject to an identifiable pe-
riod of time in which the interest is valid. Gone is the guesswork of
finding a measuring life in a commercial setting, as is the dead hand of
perpetual reversionary interests in long-dead parties.
C. Sections 36A-145 to 36A-148: Honorary Trusts, Trusts for Pets,
and Trusts for Cemetery Lots
The Trusts Drafting Committee also turned its attention to the
area of so-called honorary trusts, typically those to provide care of a
cemetery lot, care of a pet, or the saying of masses for the soul of the
testator or another person.' 31 Under the common law these are not
valid as charitable trusts because they do not fit traditional charitable
purposes or benefit the public as a whole, nor are they valid as private
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32(a) (Supp. 1995).
128. Id. § 41-32(b). The nondonative transfers provisions also exempt agreements re-
lating solely to interests in oil, gas, or minerals. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-29, -30, -32 (Supp.
1995). Surprisingly, this exemption was not the result of lobbying by the oil and gas indus-
try. Rather, it was part of the draft provided by the UPC Reporter, and reflected his desire
not to upset bona fide commercial transactions in oil and gas. Telephone Interview with
Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code (June 4, 1991).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 253-58.
130. The usual rationale for validity is that since property may be given to one charity
forever, there is no significant difference in giving property to two successive charities
forever.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-145 to -148 (1995).
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express trusts, because they lack definite human beneficiaries. 132 Nev-
ertheless, the trustee often is allowed to perform the trust, hence the
term "honorary," but cannot be compelled to do so. There is very
little North Carolina case law on honorary trusts,13 3 but sometimes
they are challenged on perpetuities or similar theories.
New North Carolina General Statutes section 36A-145, enacted
by Senate Bill 85, generally allows the trustee to perform honorary
trusts for twenty-one years. This section is similar but not identical to
current UPC section 2-907(a).134 Section 36A-146 validates trusts for
cemetery lots. 135 The section attempts to provide a comprehensive
listing of potential arrangements and to anticipate and reject potential
theoretical challenges to these arrangements, 36 while requiring com-
pliance with existing North Carolina law137 on cemetery lots. Section
36A-147 is based on a 1990 UPC section and validates trusts to pro-
vide care for pets. 38 It is somewhat similar to current UPC sections 2-
907(b) and (c). 139 The new section does not allow the trust to con-
tinue for the animal's offspring, but it does allow the trust to continue
for the animal's life, even if it should exceed twenty-one years. 40 Sec-
132. See PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 268-69
(2d ed. 1994).
133. See generally Gold v. Price, 24 N.C. App. 660,211 S.E.2d 803, cert. denied, 287 N.C.
259, 214 S.E.2d 430 (1975) (invalidating a provision of a holographic will attempting to
create a trust to care for testatrix's grave, where she did not provide any funds to maintain
the grave).
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-145 cmt. (1995).
135. Id. § 36A-146. The section has no counterpart in the UPC. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
ch. 36A-145 cmt. The Trusts Drafting Committee thought it advisable to deal specifically
with trusts for cemetery lots and to validate them. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 6.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-146 (1995).
137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19-10 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 65-7 to -12 (1994);
id. §§ 65-46 to -73.
138. Cf. U.P.C. § 2-907 (1990).
139. Cf. id. § 2-907(b), (c).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-147(b), (c) (1995). The section provides for distribution of
any unexpended trust property at the animal's death as directed in the trust or will, but if
no taker is provided by the trust or will, to the transferor or "the transferor's heirs, deter-
mined as of the date of the transferor's death under Chapter 29 of the General Statutes."
Id.
The phrase "determined as of the date of the transferor's death" was added to the
draft UPC language "the transferor's heirs" at the suggestion of the Estate Planning and
Fiduciary Law Section of the North Carolina Bar Association in order to avoid any ques-
tion as to whether the transferor's heirs were to be determined as of the transferor's death
or as of the date of termination of the trust. The time of the transferor's death is the usual
meaning of the word "heirs," and is the meaning intended by the Trusts Drafting Commit-
tee and the meaning a court would likely ascribe to the word. Nevertheless, the time of
termination of the trust would not be an impossible reading of the term, given that the time
of distribution might be a time after the transferor's death. The Fiduciary Law Section
thought, and the Trusts Drafting Committee agreed, that for purposes of consistency and
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tion 36A-148; providing for termination of small trusts with corpora
less than $100, was included at the suggestion of the Clerks of Court,
who generally have jurisdiction over trusts for pets under new section
36A-147.141 North Carolina General Statutes section 65-9 was
amended to be consistent with the trust termination provision. 42
III. APPLICATION OF THE NEW STATUTES TO RECENT NORTH
CAROLINA CASE LAW
A. Traditional Rule Against Perpetuities Cases
The history of Rule Against Perpetuities litigation in North Caro-
lina is both lengthy and convoluted. A 1979 article collected the many
(and often complex) North Carolina cases on perpetuities. 43 In the
decade and a half since 1979, the flow of perpetuities cases has contin-
ued: about twenty-six reported cases have dealt with the Rule
Against Perpetuities in one fashion or another. Of those cases, eight
have dealt with the Rule in its intended context of donative transfers
(e.g., wills and trusts).
The difficulties in applying the Rule in its intended contexts-
wills and trusts-are illustrated by the North Carolina Supreme
Court's prominent decision in Joyner v. Duncan, 44 which involved in-
terests under a testamentary trust.145 The trust gave a right to the
income from the trust for life first to Edwin Duncan (the testator's
son) and then to Edwin's widow. 4 6 Following these interests, the in-
come was payable to the testator's two existing grandchildren, Edwin
Jr. and Jane Cannon, for their lives, or to be paid to their children per
stirpes when either died. 47 These income interests are valid under
the Rule because they are gifts to people in existence at the testator's
death or to their children for whom they arelives in being. The prin-
cipal was to be paid out to the class of Edwin's children in $5000 incre-
simplicity it would be best to make it absolutely clear that status as an heir would be
determined as of the transferor's death, rather than leaving open the possibility that there
would have to be the trouble and expense of a new determination of heirship at some time
after the transferor's actual death, especially since most of these trusts for pets will not last
very long and changes in the heirship would not be likely. Letter from Ronald C. Link,
Chair, Trusts Drafting Committee, to Floyd M. Lewis, Revisor of Statutes (Oct. 7, 1994)
(on file with the authors).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-148 (1995).
142. Id § 65-9 (1994) (allowing funds to be held perpetually for such purpose).
143. See Link, supra note 4.
144. 299 N.C. 565, 264 S.E.2d 76 (1980).
145. In testamentary trusts, the period under the Rule Against Perpetuities begins to
run when the testator dies. See SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 20, § 1226.
146. Joyner, 299 N.C. at 570-71, 264 S.E.2d at 82.
147. Id. at 571, 264 S.E.2d at 83.
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ments when each grandchild reached age twenty-five and every five
years thereafter until death.148 The court erroneously upheld the in-
terests in the principal, claiming that Edwin's children were given
vested interests subject to open with enjoyment postponed.149 How-
ever, the accurate construction of such interests would be that they
are bequests contingent on the beneficiaries reaching age twenty-five,
which could occur beyond the period of the Rule.150 The final interest
created under the trust was an educational allowance of $1000 to be
paid to each great-grandchild for college for as long as the great-
grandchild remained in good academic standing.15 ' The court held
that this was a class gift vested at birth and that the testator did not
intend to include hypothetical after-born grandchildren and their chil-
dren, in essence ignoring traditional perpetuities analysis based on
what might happen. 5 ' Although the court was incorrect in sustaining
148. Id. at 572-73, 264 S.E.2d at 83-84.
149. Id. at 575, 264 S.E.2d at 85.
150. Perpetuities law has always distinguished gifts contingent on reaching a given age
from those gifts that are payable at a given age which vest immediately. The Rule invali-
dates the following devise: "To testator's son, A, for life, at A's death to A's children if
they reach 25," while validating the following: "To testator's son, A, for life, at A's death
to A's children to be paid when they reach 25." See W. Barton Leach, The Ride Against
Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1332-38 (1938).
151. Joyner, 299 N.C. at 575-76,264 S.E.2d at 85. In the event that the great-grandchild
did not remain in good academic standing, the allocated income was to be added to the
corpus. Id.
152. Id. at 576-78, 264 S.E.2d at 86-87. The court reasoned that all the children of Ed-
win Jr. and Jane (grandchildren of the testator and lives in being at the testator's death)
would be born within their parents' lives. Id. at 578, 264 S.E.2d at 87. These children
would be the great-grandchildren of the testator. The problem with this interest stems
from a possible event: Bessie Lee and Edwin Sr. might give birth to a child after the
testator's death, who might give birth to a child or children (a great-grandchild of the
testator) after the period of the Rule. This event did not occur and thus this interest would
be valid under wait-and-see principles although invalid under traditional principles, which
rely on possible, not actual, events; any hypothetical violation of the Rule, regardless of
how unlikely it is, invalidates an interest. See Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, 1187-88
(Ch. 1787) (holding that because after-born children were a possibility for a couple over 70
years old vesting of their present children's interests was impossible within the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities); Leach, supra note 20, at 642-43 ("[A] future interest is
invalid unless it is absolutely certain that it must vest within the period of perpetu-
ities.... It is immaterial that the contingencies actually do occur within the permissible
period or actually have occurred when the validity of the instrument is first litigated.");
Leach, supra note 150, at 1338-46 (discussing anomalous results in perpetuities law, includ-
ing Jee). It was at this point that the court relied on the presumption that a testator in-
tended a valid disposition of his or her property, which the courts should seek to effectuate.
The court also attempted to question the testator's meaning behind his use of the term
"great-grandchildren" in this gift as if it would mean something different to him than the
average reader. For example, the court excluded adoptees from the potential class of
"great-grandchildren." Likewise, the court excluded an indefinite line of descendants from
the class. Joyner, 299 N.C. at 576-78, 264 S.E.2d at 85-87.
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an interest clearly violative of the Rule, the case is nevertheless valua-
ble for its thorough discussion of numerous aspects of North Carolina
perpetuities law.
153
Applying the USRAP to some of the interests in Joyner v.
Duncan, the income interests in the testator's son, his son's widow,
and the testator's grandchildren would remain valid. The interests in
the principal, although validated by the court erroneously, 154 likely
would be validated because the testator's son was forty-eight years old
when the testator died; any grandchild of the testator would almost
certainly reach age twenty-five within ninety years of the testator's
death. Similarly, a provision to distribute trust property to a testator's
children or grandchildren if" 'any... come to suffering, in any other
way, save by idleness, drunkenness, or anything of the kind, so as to
become an object of charity, I want the said executor to give a part of
this to such child or grandchild' " was held invalid under traditional
perpetuities doctrine since distribution for a grandchild might occur
more than twenty-one years after the testator's death.'55 These gifts
would be allowed ninety years to vest under the USRAP.
In Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A.,' 56 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals examined the interests created by a testamen-
tary trust divided among the testator's sister, two brothers, eleven
named nieces and nephews, twelve named great-nieces and great-
nephews, and any great-niece or great-nephew born within twenty-
one years of the testator's death. 57 The testator included a saving
153. The real reason for the decision may have been that validation of the generation-
skipping trust saved the family substantial estate taxes. One suspects that the family mem-
bers who claimed that the trust violated the common-law Rule were only nominal objec-
tors and were not truly prejudiced by validation of the trust. In the end, a third child was
not born to Edwin Sr. and Bessie Lee Duncan, so all great-grandchildren were able to
point to a life in being to validate their interests, which would validate the interests under
the USRAP's wait-and-see ninety-year period.
154. For a critique of Joyner, see supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
155. Moore v. Moore, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 141,141-42 (1860) (quoting the will of Jesse
Moore). For a discussion of this case under traditional perpetuities analysis, see Link,
supra note 4, at 760.
156. 44 N.C. App. 402,261 S.E.2d 279, afj'd in part, 301 N.C. 456,272 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
For additional treatment of this case, see Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative In-:
tent, 73 IOWA L. REv. 611, 646-52 (1988).
157. For a discussion of the validity of similar provisions relating to the period of perpe-
tuities, see Leach, supra note 20, at 640-42. Professor Leach, like the Wing court, agrees
that a testamentary gift "to all descendants of mine who shall be born within twenty-one
years after my death" is valid, as is a gift "to my grandchildren who shall reach the age of
twenty-one," since all grandchildren must be born within the lifetime of the testator's chil-
dren, who are necessarily all lives in being at the death of the testator. Id. at 641. How-
ever, an inter vivos trust payable to "my grandchildren who shall reach age twenty-one," is
violative of the Rule since the testator may have other children, not lives in being at the
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clause to avoid perpetuities violations, under which the trust ceased to
exist beyond the lives of any niece or nephew, or any great-niece or
great-nephew, alive at the time of the testator's death.158 With regard
to the trust income, the court held that upon the death of a great-niece
or great-nephew, his or her share of the income was to be distributed
to his or her beneficiaries or heirs since the testator had not expressed
a condition of survivorship. 5 9 With respect to distribution of the
corpus, the court reversed the trial court, holding that the corpus was
to be distributed to the testator's intestate takers-his brothers and
sister living at his death and the three children of his predeceased
brother-with their interests postponed until the trust terminated.160
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary review
to settle conclusively the disposition of the trust corpus.' 6' After iden-
tifying two possible constructions of the testator's silence on the distri-
bution of the corpus, the court chose a reading of the testator's entire
creation of the trust, who themselves may have children causing a remote vesting of their
interests. Id.
158. Wing, 44 N.C. App. at 405, 261 S.E.2d at 281. Saving clauses are commonly used
by experienced lawyers in drafting wills and trusts involving future interests. See
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 18, at 318 n.4. These insure that the Rule Against
Perpetuities will not be violated by remote vesting or by a trust that lasts beyond the pe-
riod of perpetuities. Although a trust may last beyond the period of perpetuities in some
cases, there are too many potential difficulties under property law for the typical lawyer to
fully protect against a violation of the Rule. See Leach, supra note 20, at 671 (suggesting
the limitation of trusts to the period of perpetuities to avoid complications).
The Wing trust had been before the North Carolina courts twice before. In the first
case, the court held that the testator had not intended to include adopted children in Trust
Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 537, 142 S.E.2d 182, 187 (1965). The second case held that
this trust did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Wing v. Trust Co., 35 N.C. App.
346, 350, 241 S.E.2d 397, 400, cert denied, 295 N.C. 95, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978). The second
case was appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's opinion in part and
affirmed in part.
The suit involved all the necessary parties and trustees to determine distribution upon
the death of any great-niece or great-nephew. The trial court concluded that upon the
death of a great-niece or great-nephew, the share of income payable to him or her would
go to either the legatees of the decedent or the intestate heirs, and the corpus would be
split in seventeen equal shares to the great-niece or great-nephew if living or to the lega-
tees or heirs, with final distribution occurring upon the death of the last niece, nephew,
great-niece, and great-nephew living at the testator's death. Wing, 44 N.C. App. at 406,261
S.E.2d at 282. The trial court's analysis of distribution of the corpus was reversed by the
court of appeals which held that interests in the corpus passed to the intestate takers of the
testator, namely one-fourth to his sister, one-fourth to each brother living at his death, and
one-fourth to the three children of the brother who had predeceased the testator. Id. at
412, 261 S.E.2d at 285.
159. Wing, 44 N.C. App. at 413, 261 S.E.2d at 286. The court relied on the testator's
handling of the brothers', sister's, nieces' and nephews' interests under the trust which
contained provisions in the event that one of them predeceased the others. Id.
160. Id. at 412, 261 S.E.2d at 285.
161. 301 N.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
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dispositive plan to imply 62 a distribution of the trust corpus through
the will to the seventeen natural-born nieces and nephews of the testa-
tor.163 In conclusion, the court addressed the acceptable duration of
the trust in explaining the testator's use of a saving clause written at a
time when North Carolina law required that a trust for a private pur-
pose terminate within the perpetuities period. 64 The court used the
saving clause as evidence to support the testator's desire to protect the
interests of his great-nieces and great-nephews rather than limit
them.165 These interests continue to be valid under the USRAP be-
cause the saving clause terminates the trust within the perpetuities
period.
Class gifts-as in Joyner and Wing-have significant potential for
perpetuities violations, leading some scholars to caution lawyers to
identify beneficiaries by name rather than rely on a class designa-
tion.166 For a class gift to be valid, future interests in all members of
the class must vest within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities;
otherwise, the entire gift fails even though some members fulfilled the
conditions within the period. 67 The "rule of convenience" artificially
closes class membership when a gift is qualified to be distributed. 68
Under the USRAP class gifts are more likely to be validated, since in
most cases all the class members become eligible to take their inter-
ests within the perpetuities period and what-might-have-been is not
considered. In the event that all members of a class do not become
eligible for distribution within the USRAP's ninety-year period, the
court can reform the interest to include only those eligible for distri-
bution at the end of ninety years.
162. It is commonly said that gifts by implication are neither common nor favored. In
the absence of a clear dispositive intention or plan, it is unlikely that courts will imply such
a gift. See, eg., Burney v. Holloway, 225 N.C. 633, 637, 36 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1945) (stating that a
gift by implication cannot rest on mere conjecture).
163. Wing, 301 N.C. at 462, 272 S.E.2d at 95. This gave each of the natural born nieces
and nephews an equal share in the trust corpus. The construction chosen by the court of
appeals was that the testator's silence might indicate his intention that the corpus not be
disposed of by the -will. Id.
164. Id. at 465-66, 272 S.E.2d at 97. For the development of North Carolina law in this
area, see Link, supra note 4, at 793-804.
165. Wing, 301 N.C. at 466, 272 S.E.2d at 97.
166. See, e.g., Leach, supra note 20, at 670.
167. This is known as the all-or-nothing rule in class gifts; a class gift must vest or fail as
a unit. For a discussion of this rule, see SiMa.s & SMrrH, supra note 20, § 1265; Leach, supra
note 20, at 648-51.
168. The class may close at the testator's death if distribution is to take place at that
time. Otherwise, class closure occurs when any member is entitled to distribution. See
Cole v. Cole, 229 N.C. 757, 760, 51 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1949).
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In Sherrod v. Any Child or Children,69 the court of appeals held
that a gift of a farm in trust to two granddaughters and any unborn
children of the testator's son until they reached age thirty did not vio-
late the Rule Against Perpetuities as all interests would vest within
twenty-one years of a life in being, namely the son.170 The court relied
on Wise v. Leonhardt'7' to limit the class of takers to those alive at the
testator's death.'7 2 Wise held that when real property was involved
and its distribution was postponed to a later date, the class closed at
the testator's death, not at the date of distribution, unless there was an
intervening life estate.173 Thus, in Sherrod, the members of the class
held vested interests in the trust property with enjoyment postponed
at the testator's death, and the Rule Against Perpetuities was not vio-
lated. 74 These trust interests would continue to be valid under the
USRAP since all interests would vest within the period of perpetu-
ities, although the enjoyment of the gifts was possibly postponed be-
yond the perpetuities period.
Likewise, the court of appeals had difficulty construing class gifts
under a will in Thornhill v. Riegg. 75 A guiding beacon to courts in
perpetuities cases is the construction of the interests to avoid invalid-
ity.'76 However, in its opinion, the court of appeals seemingly mis-
169. 65 N.C. App. 252,308 S.E.2d 904 (1983), affd as modified, 312 N.C. 74,320 S.E.2d
669 (1984).
170. Id. at 259, 308 S.E.2d at 909.
171. 128 N.C. 289, 38 S.E. 892 (1901).
172. Sherrod, 65 N.C. App. at 258, 308 S.E.2d at 908.
173. 128 N.C. at 290-91, 38 S.E. at 892. In Wise, class closure operated to the disadvan-
tage of the testator's son, who might have had children by the date of distribution, but did
not have any at the testator's death. The Wise rule was grounded in the belief that title had
to be vested in a presently ascertainable group of people to prevent the inalienability and
unmarketability of land if the class remained open for the lives of the testator's children.
See Sherrod, 65 N.C. App. at 257, 308 S.E.2d at 907. However, this decision has been
criticized by courts on three grounds. First, as this case involved a trust, legal title was at
all times held by the trustee and equitable title by the members of the class born prior to
the testator's death. The legal title would be alienable by the trustee. Second, because
distribution was postponed to a later date, keeping the class open would cause no hardship.
Third, keeping the class open satisfies the policy of including as many takers as possible.
Id. at 257, 308 S.E.2d at 908.
174. Id. at 259, 308 S.E.2d at 909. The Rule Against Perpetuities is concerned with
remote vesting, not remote enjoyment of property. Even if the court had allowed the class
to remain open until distribution, the Rule Against Perpetuities would not have been vio-
lated since any child of the testator's son would take a vested interest subject to partial
divestment at birth with apparently no condition of survivorship until age thirty. See id. at
261, 308 S.E.2d at 910 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (stating that the devise was intended to
benefit children of the testator's son regardless of the date of their birth and should have
been upheld). For a discussion of vesting and vesting with postponed enjoyment, see
SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 1232-33.
175. 95 N.C. App. 532, 383 S.E.2d 447 (1989).
176. See Leach, supra note 20, at 657-59; Link, supra note 4, at 765-67.
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spoke when it said the court should construe a document according to
the testator's intention prior to considering the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities.177 In Thornhill, the testator sought to have the trust property
divided into two equal shares for his children or the descendants of
any deceased child after giving his wife income for life and any sup-
port payments as necessary.178 The testator provided that if a child
predeceased him or his wife, that child's interest passed to his or her
descendants "when and as they attain the age of twenty-five years.'
'1 79
Unfortunately, the court erred in its analysis of this interest, which
clearly violates the Rule, when the court categorized the interest as a
vested gift with enjoyment postponed. 80 Instead, like the principal
interests in Joyner, such interests are typically construed as bequests
contingent on the legatee attaining twenty-five, not vested until that
time.' Along with the children's bequests, the testator empowered
the trustee to distribute the principal as needed for the "support and
177. Thornhill, 95 N.C. App. at 536, 383 S.E.2d at 449. However, in its analysis the
court favored a valid construction as under traditional analysis, presuming that the testator
intended to comply with the law. Id. at 538, 383 S.E.2d at 451.
178. Id. at 537-38, 383 S.E.2d at 450. This interest is valid since any interest is vested
upon the death of the testator's wife, a life in being. The court construed the term "de-
scendants" to mean children of the testator's children to avoid any possible perpetuities
violation; such devises to grandchildren are validated by the lives of their parents, who are
necessarily lives in being at the death of the testator. See also Wachovia Bank of N.C. v.
Willis, 118 N.C. App. 144, 148-49,454 S.E.2d 293,296 (1995) (interpreting the term "issue"
to mean "perpetual succession of [his] lineal descendants").
179. Thornhill, 95 N.C. App. at 539, 383 S.E.2d at 451. Technically, this gift would
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities; while a child of the testator is a life in being, that
child might have a child immediately prior to his or her death whose interest in the trust
property could not vest within twenty-one years of a life in being at the testator's death.
Since this grandchild of the testator could be born after the testator's death, there would be
no life in being to validate the interest.
180. Id. To achieve such an interpretation of this interest, the testator should have said
"to be paid at age twenty-five," rather than the provision at issue: "descendants of a child
deceased at my death shall receive their share of the trust when and as they attain the age
of twenty-five years." Id. A gift "when" a person reaches twenty-five is not vested with
postponed enjoyment-it is conditioned on reaching twenty-five, as stated in Clobberie's
Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 476 (Ch. 1677):
In one Clobberie's Case it was held, that where one bequeathed a sum of
money to a woman, at her age of twenty-one years, or day of marriage, to be paid
unto her with interest, and she died before either, that the money should go to
her executor; and was so decreed by my Lord Chancellor Fynch [later Lord Not-
tingham, see supra note 19].
But he said, if money were bequeathed to one at his age of twenty-one years;
if he dies before that age the money is lost.
On the other side, if money be given to one, to be paid at the age of twenty-
one years; though, if the party dies before, it shall go to the executors.
Id. at 476; see also W. BARTON LEACH & JAMES K. LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTs AND Es-
TATE PLANNING 287 (1961) (discussing the case).
181. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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education" of a descendant of a deceased child. Although the court
upheld this interest, it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. 1' 2 Fi-
nally, in the event that any interest in the trust was not distributed to a
child of the testator before he or she died, the testator provided that
the remaining interest would pass to any descendant per stirpes or in
equal shares to the testator's other children or their descendants.183
The court properly voided this interest because the great-grandchil-
dren definitely were not certain to reach age twenty-five within the
perpetuities period, given that they might be born just before the
death of all lives in being and have only twenty-one years to reach age
twenty-five, an impossibility."8 Under the USRAP, this gift of discre-
tionary trust property to children or grandchildren would be subject to
judicial reformation if the provisions of the trust did not vest within
the ninety-year wait-and-see period.
Similarly, in Coble v. Patterson,18 5 the court correctly held that a
holographic will with gifts of trust income to the testator's sisters and
their children did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities since the
gifts to the sisters and their children vested immediately upon the
death of the testator's wife.'86 Following the decision in Wing,' s7 the
court held that the gift of trust income not limited in time was
equivalent to a gift of the principal.188 These interests, valid under the
common-law Rule, would continue to be valid under the new
legislation.
B. Nondonative Transfers (Options in Gross, etc.)
Property owners may seek to limit a grantee's ability to alienate
the property by placing restrictive provisions in the instrument of con-
veyance. To prevent property owners from unduly restricting the free
alienation of land and other property interests, the courts developed
several mechanisms to invalidate conditions and interests against pub-
lic policy. While clarity and conciseness are desirable in property law,
182. 95 N.C. App. at 539, 383 S.E.2d at 451. The bequest violates the Rule because
distribution of principal may occur beyond the perpetuities period, i.e. more than twenty-
one years after the death of the testator's child. Interestingly, this provision when related
to the next, presumes no interest in the trust property until age twenty-five, not the inter-
pretation espoused by the court.
183. Id. at 540, 383 S.E.2d at 451-52.
184. Id. at 540, 383 S.E.2d at 452.
185. 114 N.C. App. 447, 442 S.E.2d 119 (1994).
186. Id. at 453, 442 S.E.2d at 122.
187. 44 N.C. App. 402,261 S.E.2d 279, affd in part, 301 N.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
188. Coble, 114 N.C. App. at 453,442 S.E.2d at 122. This principle was also articulated
in Wing v. Trust Co., 301 N.C. 456, 465, 272 S.E.2d 90, 97 (1980). For a discussion, see
supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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they are unlikely to be found in this area, for courts often confuse
dissimilar concepts such as the doctrine against unreasonable re-
straints on alienation' 89 with traditional perpetuities analysis.
Although the rule against direct restraints on alienation and the
Rule Against Perpetuities have similar goals of preserving the market-
ability and the alienability of property interests,190 they are distinct in
their substance and their operation.' 91 The older of the two, the rule
against direct restraints on alienation, deals with direct restraints,
192
189. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
190. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, div. 1, pt. 1, at 5-11; Leach, supra note 20, at 640.
There are four principal objections to restraints on alienation. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER,
supra note 18, at 223. First, such restraints make land less marketable, sometimes even
unmarketable. Second, such restraints serve to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few.
Third, improvements on land are discouraged since the owner cannot sell the property to
recoup any investment and banks are unlikely to provide money for improvements without
gaining a mortgage as security. Finally, restraints prevent creditors from reaching property
when creditors have relied on such security in extending credit. Id.
191. Rules governing indirect restraints on alienation, like the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, provide a definite time frame in which the interest must vest to be valid. Indirect
restraints that are too remote will be voided under such a rule, whereas reasonable indirect
restraints will not be. See SIMns & SMITH, supra note 20, § 1116 (discussing the essential
differences between these rules and the policy reasons supporting them). The authors note
that if the rule were different and all future interests were disallowed, the freedom of dis-
position of property would be unduly limited. The incidental infringement of alienation is
permitted because of the benefits that stem from either the creation of the future interest
or a trust. On the other hand, direct restraints limit presently vested property interests, not
necessarily future interests. Id. A direct restraint on alienation may be invalid without
respect to the length of time it lasts if it is unreasonable in other respects. For example, the
following restraint would be invalid as a total disabling restraint on alienation regardless of
any time limit: 0 grants Blackacre to A and his heirs and any attempt to transfer any
interest in Blackacre by any means is hereby null and void. This restraint would not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities, because A would have a presently vested interest.
192. Disabling restraints are those that "seek to invalidate a later transfer of that inter-
est, in whole or in part. . . ." RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 3.1; see SIMES & SMITH,
supra note 20, §§ 1131, 1136-46. These restraints are the most restrictive and therefore
most objectionable restraints that a grantor can place on the transfer of a property interest.
Such restraints are likely to be struck by a court; however, they are commonly accepted in
situations where completely free alienation is likely to adversely impact another party's
property interests, such as transfer of an equitable interest in a trust, transfer of property
involving landlords and tenants, sale of residential property in cooperatives or condomini-
ums, and sale of stock in a close corporation. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 3.1 cmt.
a. Disabling restraints are treated more restrictively than forfeiture and promissory re-
straints since they have the greatest adverse affect on free alienation and marketability of
land. See SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 20, § 1137.
A forfeiture restraint is a condition placed on a property transfer which either voids or
subjects a property interest to termination if a transfer is attempted. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 18, § 3.2; S MEs & SMITH, supra note 20, § 1131, 1147-60. Forfeiture restraints are
less restrictive than disabling restraints, as alienation is possible, but at a cost. They are
more likely to be validated by a court than a disabling restraint. An example of a forfei-
ture restraint is: "0 grants Blackacre to A and his heirs, but if A transfers the property, to
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whereas the Rule Against Perpetuities addresses indirect restraints on
alienation.
193
B." Such restraints are often used where disabling restraints are unavailable. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 18, §3.2 cmt. a.
Promissory restraints, the least restrictive restraint on alienation, are those that condi-
tion a property interest with contractual liability in the event that a transfer is made or
attempted. Id., § 3.3; SiMEs & SMITH, supra note 20, §§ 1131, 1161-67. If a person holding
an interest subject to a promissory restraint violates the restraint placed on the land, he or
she is liable either in damages or equitable relief listed in the instrument transferring the
interest. An example is: "0 grants Blackacre to A and his heirs, and A promises not to
transfer Blackacre during his lifetime." Of the three types of restraints, promissory ones
are the most likely to be validated, because they do not take the property from the holder
but merely subject him or her to damages for breach of the promise.
The rule against direct restraints provides that if a conveyance of property contains a
condition prohibiting the grantee from alienating the property, the condition is void as
unreasonable and the property is held in fee simple absolute. RESTATEMENT, supra note
18, div. 1, pt. 2, at 142-44 (citing THOMAS LrrrLETON, TENURES §§ 360-62 (Eugene
Wambaugh ed., 1903)). The Restatement provides for two different rules regulating direct
restraints, one for disabling restraints and the other for forfeiture and promissory re-
straints. According to § 4.1, a disabling restraint is automatically invalid if the restraint
makes it impossible to transfer a property interest ever; and in all other cases, validity is
possible only after a determination of reasonableness in light of the circumstances. Several
rules govern the validity of forfeiture interests. A forfeiture restraint attached to a life
estate or an interest for a term of years that terminates upon the end of a person's life is
valid. Id. § 4.2(1). On the other hand, a forfeiture restraint that makes it impossible to
transfer a property interest without the penalty of forfeiture at any time is invalid. Id.
§ 4.2(2). Finally, a forfeiture interest may be validated if it is reasonable in light of the
circumstances relating to the granting of the interest. Id. § 4.2(3). A promissory restraint
is valid if it would be valid under the tests of forfeiture restraints. Id. § 4.3. In all cases, the
reasonableness of a restraint on alienation is examined from the totality of the circum-
stances, including the purpose, duration, scope, nature of the restraint, and marketability
of the property restrained. Id. § 4.2(3); SimEs & SMrrH, supra note 20, § 1168 (discussing
the dominant factors in determining whether a direct restraint on alienation is
unacceptable).
The rule operates most restrictively on those interests that totally restrain alienation,
and partial restraints on alienation may be upheld. For example, a grantor can limit the
group of acceptable transferees or the time frame for alienation, and such restrictions may
be upheld. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, §§ 4.1 cmts. a-g, 4.2 cmts. a-y (discussing a
variety of issues related to disabling and forfeiture restraints).
193. If a direct restraint unreasonably restricts a grantee's ability to alienate property,
the condition is void and the property is conveyed as if the burden never existed. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 4.1 cmt. a. Indirect restraints are those that in effect re-
strain a grantee's ability to alienate his or her property, but were created with some other
purpose in mind. SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 20, § 1112. The most common forms of
indirect restraints on alienation are future interests and some forms of trusts.
Indirect restraints are governed primarily by the Rule Against Perpetuities and re-
lated rules. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, div. 1, pt. 2, at 143; SIMES & SMITH, supra
note 20, § 1114 (describing the historical development of the doctrine of illegal restraints).
The Rule Against Perpetuities is still a vital part of modem property law despite its com-
plexity and history, because it serves a valid social purpose in preventing perpetual inter-
ests in land that make land unmarketable. When the Rule was created, it was believed that
if land were taken off the market a reduction in productivity, dead-hand control of prop-
erty, and concentration of wealth would ensue, all of which were undesirable in England
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The application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to nondonative
(i.e., commercial) transactions has been particularly nettlesome in
North Carolina. Of the twenty-six perpetuities cases in the last dec-
ade and a half, seventeen have dealt with nondonative transfers, such
as preemptions and options. 9 4
where land was scarce. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 20, § 1117 (addressing the policy
reasons supporting the various rules favoring the alienability of land and the Rule Against
Perpetuities). The inability to alienate land decreases productivity in that an owner unwill-
ing or unable to use the land productively would typically seek to sell the land to a person
willing and able to make the land productive. When an owner cannot sell because a future
interest causes uncertainty about the title to land, the land will remain unproductive until
the condition is satisfied or the future interest vests. Id. While some amount of control in
the disposition of one's property through creative future interests is acceptable, interests
and conditions that are too remote prevent the present owner of land from freely consum-
ing and fully enjoying the property.
During a series of lectures given in 1955, Professor Lewis Simes examined the policies
behind the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. See SiMES, supra note 120. Professor
Simes first suggested protection of alienability to secure productivity as the justification for
the Rule. Id. at 36. However, he rejected alienability as a satisfactory rationale for the
Rule in modem times because: (1) future interests subject to the Rule were nearly always
in trusts, where the trustee had the power to alienate the property; (2) shares of corporate
stock were often involved in such interests and the corporation always retained the right to
alienate its property; (3) in emergencies, judicial sales of property could be compelled to
eliminate future interests in the property; (4) legislation, such as a 1925 English statute,
provided for a power of sale in many situations involving future interests; and (5) adminis-
trative procedures for increased productivity of land were more effective in modem social
states. Id. at 40-47. Professor Simes found two justifications for the continued vitality of
the Rule. First, the Rule balanced the interests of the living and the dead in controlling the
disposition of property. Id. at 58-59. Second, he felt that property should be controlled by
the living rather than the dead. Id. at 59-60. He criticized the operation of the Rule for its
arbitrary and inequitable results. Id. at 63-71. To achieve a more user-friendly, less harsh
Rule Against Perpetuities, Professor Simes proposed several reforms: (1) broadly constru-
ing interests, consistently with the intent of the testator, to avoid perpetuities violations; (2)
using cy pres to offset the harshness of the Rule; (3) regulating possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry through separate legislation; and (4) eliminating the Rule's distinction be-
tween vested and contingent remainders. Id. at 74-82. Most of these recommendations are
implemented in the new legislation.
194. A preemptive right "requires that, before the property conveyed may be sold to
another party, it must first be offered to the conveyor or his heirs, or to some specially
designated person." 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64 (A. James Casner ed., 1952);
see 6 RICHARD POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 12-13; Snvms & SMIrH, supra note
20, § 1154; Thomas W. Christopher, Options to Purchase Real Property in North Carolina,
44 N.C. L. REv. 63, 66 (1965). Preemptive rights are also known as rights of first refusal.
Until a third party attempts to purchase some property, a preemptive right will not be
triggered.
An option, on the other hand, is a right to purchase or otherwise acquire an interest in
property at a specified price for a limited period of time. Scholars have considered options
to be indirect restraints rather than direct restraints since the primary purpose of an option
is to allow a party to purchase land, rather than prevent the alienation of land. See SiMES
& SMITH, supra note 20, § 1154. Thus, if options are subject to any rule, it may be the Rule
Against Perpetuities, invalidating any option exercisable beyond the period of the Rule.
Id. At any time before its expiration, an option may be exercised without any action by a
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Perhaps the case most illustrative of the need for reform of North
Carolina's law regulating preemptions and options in gross is Smith v.
Mitchell.'95 In Smith, the North Carolina Supreme Court broadened
the reach of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities by holding
that the test for the validity of a preemptive right to repurchase land is
not whether the preemption is exercisable within a reasonable time,
but whether its exercise is limited to a period within the Rule Against
Perpetuities.' 96 The validity of the preemptive right' 97 had been chal-
lenged as an unreasonable restraint on alienation, but the court de-
voted much of its opinion to the Rule Against Perpetuities. The court
recognized commercial options as "useful and necessary devices," and
stated that the reasonableness of any option or preemptive right was
dependent on two considerations: its price determination provisions
third party. Preemptive rights may be restraints on alienation if they are not reasonable
with respect to duration of the right and the price to be paid. RESTATEMENT, supra note
18, § 4.4. Preemptive rights are traditionally exempted from coverage under the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities because they often take the form of a vested right in the
grantor, like a right of reentry, possibility of reverter, or other reversionary interest. SIMEs
& SMITH, supra note 20, § 1154.
Compared to preemptive rights, options may be even more problematic. Under one
view, options are presently vested interests in the grantor, exempt from the Rule Against
Perpetuities, but subject to regulation by the rule against restraints on alienation. See
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 18, at 312. Under another view, options are subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities on the theory that exercise of the option is like tile happen-
ing of a specified event causing an executory interest to vest in the grantor or the grantor's
successors in interest. See id.
195. 301 N.C. 58, 269 S.E.2d 608 (1980).
196. ' Id. at 66, 269 S.E.2d at 613. For a variety of views on this issue, see Mazzeo v.
Kartman, 560 A.2d 733, 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a preemptive
option to repurchase land is subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, but is valid if exercis-
able within a reasonable time); Izzo v. Brooks, 435 N.Y.S.2d 485, 490-92 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980) (holding that a perpetual fixed-price preemptive option did not violate the rule
against direct restraints on alienation, nor the Rule Against Perpetuities, because it was
vested subject to defeasance); Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 90 S.E.2d 10, 11 (Ga. 1955)
(holding that a conveyance conditioned on use of the land only for school purposes with a
reservation of a right to repurchase violated the Rule Against Perpetuities); see also SIMES
& SMITH, supra note 20, § 1154 n.46 (citing cases with similar holdings).
197. The restrictive covenants at issue were as follows:
If any future owner of lands herein described shall desire to sell the lands owned
by him, he shall offer the parties of the first part the option to repurchase said
property at a price no higher than the lowest price he is willing to accept from any
other purchaser. Parties of the first part agree to exercise said option or to reject
same in writing within 14 days of said offer. This covenant shall be binding on the
parties of the first part and their heirs, successors, administrators, and executors
or assigns for as long as W. Osmond Smith, Jr. shall live and for 20 years from the
date of his death unless sooner rescinded.
Smith, 301 N.C. at 59-60, 269 S.E.2d at 610 (citation omitted). Apparently, the drafter of
the preemption was aware of a possible perpetuities challenge, since he limited the dura-
tion of the preemption to a life in being (W. Osmond Smith, Jr.) plus twenty years.
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and its duration.198 The Smith court decided to adopt what it consid-
ered to be a clear rule for determining a reasonable duration of a re-
straint on alienation-a right exercisable only within the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. 99 The court noted that such a rule would
"avoid lengthy litigation,"2 ' despite the reality that few practicing at-
torneys understand the Rule Against Perpetuities or can identify a
period of time within the rule or the relevant measuring lives for any
given set of facts. Thus, after Smith, a valid preemptive right must be
limited to lives in being plus twenty-one years and reflect a price re-
lated either to the market value of the property or a price set by the
seller.2 0o
In the aftermath of the Smith decision, a variety of decisions con-
fused the Rule Against Perpetuities and the rule against restraints on
alienation. In 1992, in Village of Pinehurst v. Regional Investments,
20 2
the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a right of first refusal to
purchase sewage and water systems on behalf of Village of Pinehurst
198. Id. at 63,269 S.E.2d at 611 (citing 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 194,
§ 26.66, at 509). The absence of a reasonable price mechanism may cause a preemption to
fail. In Levan v. Eidson, 86 N.C. App. 100, 101,356 S.E.2d 396,397 (1987), which involved
a right of first refusal over a parcel of land from the defendants if the plaintiffs ever de-
cided to sell it, the court invalidated a contract provision that specified:
That for and in consideration of the parties of the second part [plaintiffs]
having purchased property from the parties of the first part [defendant and her
deceased husband], the said parties of the first part do hereby agree and grant
unto the parties of the second part the following:
That if at any time the parties of the first part decided to sell their property
located on the Southeast corner of U.S. Highway No. 21 and N.C. Road No. 2171,
that they will first offer the same for sale to the parties of the second part.
Id. at 101, 356 S.E.2d at 397. Notice that this language in no way includes a reference to a
price term, which ultimately invalidates the right of first refusal. The preemptive right does
not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities since it appears to apply only to the grantors and
grantees, who are lives in being. Id. at 102, 356 S.E.2d at 398. In Levan, the court held that
if a preemptive right does not link the price either to the fair market value of the property
or to the seller's price for third parties, the right fails. Id.
199. Smith, 301 N.C. at 66, 269 S.E.2d at 613.
200. Id. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in determining measuring lives, see
supra note 18 and accompanying text. In the nondonative transfers context, the determi-
nation of measuring lives would seem to be particularly uncertain. In wills and trusts at
least there are some obvious candidates (e.g., beneficiaries), but in options, preemptions,
and the like there often would be no natural connections to human lives if the parties to
the agreement were business entities. Even if the original grantors and grantees were indi-
viduals, there would be no other obvious candidates for measuring lives.
201. Smith, 301 N.C. at 65, 269 S.E.2d at 613.
202. 330 N.C. 725,412 S.E.2d 645, reh'g denied, 331 N.C. 292,417 S.E.2d 71 (1992). For
additional discussion of the impact of Village of Pinehurst, see Alan D. Mclnnes, Note,
Village of Pinehurst v. Regional Invs. of Moore: Perpetuating the Rule Against Perpetuities
in the Realm of Preemptive Rights-North Carolina Refuses to Accept and Exception to the
Rule, 71 N.C. L. REv. 2115 (1993).
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residents, which had unlimited duration, violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 2°3 Although the preemptive right was part of a commer-
cial, rather than a personal or residential, transaction, the court re-
fused to validate it.2 04 To be consistent with Smith, the court should
have ruled that the right of refusal was an unreasonable restraint on
alienation because it was not limited in duration to a reasonable time,
namely the perpetuities period of lives in being plus twenty-one years.
In dissent, Justice Meyer challenged the applicability and utility
of the Rule Against Perpetuities in the commercial world. Relying on
the commonly recognized purpose behind the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities-"to prevent.., property from being fettered with future inter-
ests so remote that the alienability of the land and its marketability
would be impaired, preventing its full utilization for the benefit of so-
ciety at large as well as of its current owners" 2°5-0Justice Meyer rea-
soned that this option did not restrain free alienation by the lessor
since he could still sell the property at any time as long as the lessee
was given the opportunity to purchase the property first.20 6 Although
he was unable to persuade the rest of the court, Justice Meyer had the
better argument in Village of Pinehurst.
In the past decade, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has de-
cided a variety of cases involving the Rule Against Perpetuities in the
context of preemptive rights. In Snipes v. Snipes,0 7 the court applied
the perpetuities time limit to a right of first refusal in a lease, holding
that a right of first refusal not to exceed fifteen years was not an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation since it fell within the period of the
Rule.2 08 In Coxe v. Wyatt,2 09 the court rejected the validity of a pre-
203. Id. at 728, 412 S.E.2d at 646.
204. Id. at 729, 412 S.E.2d at 646-47.
205. Id. at 732, 412 S.E.2d at 648 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Anderson v. 50 E.
72nd St. Condominium, 505 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed,
504 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1987)).
206. Id. at 735, 412 S.E.2d at 650 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Prior to the supreme court's
decision in Pinehurst, the court of appeals had ruled that the right of first refusal violated
the Rule Against Perpetuities and was void. Village of Pinehurst v. Regional Invs. of
Moore, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 114, 117, 387 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1990), aff'd, 330 N.C. 725, 412
S.E.2d 645, reh'g denied, 331 N.C. 292, 417 S.E.2d 71 (1992). Like the supreme court, the
court of appeals' majority seemed to confuse the Rule Against Perpetuities with the rule
against restraints on alienation, see id. at 117, 387 S.E.2d at 224, and the dissent argued that
the Rule Against Perpetuities was inapplicable. Id. at 118, 387 S.E.2d at 224-25 (Phillips,
J., dissenting). A few months later, the court of appeals addressed other issues in the
Pinehurst case, including the applicability of the public convenience and necessity test to
the transfer of water and sewer franchises and the means of obtaining approval of such a
transfer. State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Pinehurst, 99 N.C. App. 224, 227-30, 393 S.E.2d 111,
113-15 (1990), af9'd, 331 N.C. 278, 415 S.E.2d 199 (1992).
207. 55 N.C. App. 498, 286 S.E.2d 591, affd, 306 N.C. 373, 293 S.E.2d 187 (1982).
208. Id. at 502-03, 286 S.E.2d at 594.
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emptive right that was of no stated duration as violative of the Rule
Against Perpetuities and therefore legally insignificant,21° an ap-
proach relied upon in Mizell v. Greensboro Jaycees.211 In Nichols v.
Lake Toxaway Co.,2 12 a right of first refusal limited in duration to the
life of the grantee was held not to violate the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities since it would be exercised or not within some life in being. In
reaching its decision, the Nichols court employed two constructional
rules. First, a more specific provision will control a more general
one.213 That rule tied the preemptive right to the life of the grantee
even though more general language in the deed left the duration of
the right open. Second, a construction that validates an instrument
will be preferred whenever possible. 1 4 In this case, linking the pre-
emptive right to the life of the grantee was preferred.215
In an attempt to save preemptive rights from the Rule Against
Perpetuities, some courts have employed the wait-and-see doctrine.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected this doctrine in Peele v.
Wilson County Board of Education"1 6 based on its interpretation that
Smith had removed the validity of preemptive rights from the ques-
tion of what was reasonable under the circumstances.21 7
In another line of cases, both the court of appeals and federal
courts have resisted applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to com-
mercial transactions and contractual performance. In Rodin v. Mer-
ritt,2" 8 a contract for the sale of land was conditioned upon rezoning
209. 83 N.C. App. 131, 349 S.E.2d 75 (1986), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 103, 353
S.E.2d 107 (1987).
210. Id. at 133-34, 349 S.E.2d at 77. Note that the court did not consider implying that
the parties intended that the right of first refusal last only a reasonable period of time,
namely twenty-one years. For discussion of the implications of such a result, see infra
notes 218-21, 225-26 and accompanying text.
211. 105 N.C. App. 284,290,412 S.E.2d 904, 907 (1992). In Mizell, Southern Life Insur-
ance Company had conveyed a parcel of real estate to the Greensboro Jaycees-Greensboro
Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc. subject to a right of first refusal limited to 25 years, a
duration violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities according to the court. Following the
result of Coxe, the Mizell court disregarded the reference to the right of first refusal in the
sale contract with Mizell because the right was legally void and therefore insignificant.
212. 98 N.C. App. 313, 390 S.E.2d 770, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 141, 394 S.E.2d 178
(1990).
213. Id. at 317, 390 S.E.2d at 773.
214. Id. at 318, 390 S.E.2d at 773.
215. Id.
216. 56 N.C. App. 555,289 S.E.2d 890, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 386,294 S.E.2d 210
(1982).
217. Id. at 560, 289 S.E.2d at 893. For supposed simplicity, the court preferred to limit
the duration of preemptive rights to twenty-one years after some life in being at the inter-
est's creation.
218. 48 N.C. App. 64,268 S.E.2d 539, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 402, 274 S.E.2d 226
(1980), and motion to reconsider denied, 274 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. 1981).
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and annexation of the land.219 The seller attempted to back out of the
deal on the ground that the rezoning might not take place within a
period of any lives in being plus twenty-one years, thus violating the
Rule. ° Judge Morris upheld the contract by reasoning that the par-
ties must have contemplated a reasonable time for performance, and a
reasonable time would be less than twenty-one years.221 Noting that
this interest was in gross and thus subject to a twenty-one year period
of performance under the Rule Against Perpetuities,222 Judge Morris
examined the policy behind the Rule223 and discounted the need for
such a rule in commercial transactions while supporting its use in non-
commercial transactions." 4
Other cases have followed the reasoning used in Rodin. For ex-
ample, in Love v. United States,225 a federal district court applying
North Carolina law recognized that performance under a contract is
presumed to be within a reasonable time, which would be not more
than twenty-one years.2 26 In Continental Cablevision v. United Broad-
casting,22 7 the Fourth Circuit employed similar reasoning in a case de-
cided under Massachusetts law involving Continental Cablevision's
right of first refusal for the purchase of assets and stock in United
Broadcasting Company, a cable company.228 The court briefly consid-
ered the propriety of applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to a right
of first refusal because "[o]f all the options, a right of first refusal is
one of the least obnoxious to the policy concerns of the rule. '22 9 Ulti-
mately, the court sided with the majority of states which had subjected
rights of first refusal to the Rule230 and concluded that a valid right of
first refusal was restricted to a reasonable period of time, which would
219. Id. at 66-68, 268 S.E.2d at 541-42.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 71, 268 S.E.2d at 543-44.
222. The court followed standard usage in referring to interests where the twenty-one-
year period of the Rule Against Perpetuities was not tied to any life in being as being "in
gross," valid only if the contingency must happen within twenty-one years. Id. at 68, 268
S.E.2d at 541-42. The lack of measuring lives is common in commercial transactions.
223. For a discussion of the creation of and policy behind the Rule Against Perpetuities,
see supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
224. Rodin, 48 N.C. App. at 68-69, 268 S.E.2d at 542.
225. 889 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
226. Id. at 1565-66. The Love decision involved a contract for the conveyance of a
railroad right-of-way under which the court implied the condition that the railroad track
had to be laid within twenty-one years. Id. at 1550-51.
227. 873 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1989).
228. Id. at 718-19.
229. Id. at 722 n.11.
230. See id. at 722 (citing cases).
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be a maximum of twenty-one years.231 The court justified having a
fixed duration for rights of first refusal because of its certainty of re-
sult, its effectuation of parties' intention, and its simplicity.232
In the view of the somewhat idiosyncratic and unpredictable ap-
proach North Carolina courts have taken, the new legislation's appli-
cation to preemptions, like those in Smith and Village of Pinehurst, or
to options in gross, is unsure. The North Carolina courts could inter-
pret the new law in a number of ways: (1) hold that the new legisla-
tion does not apply, (a) because Smith chose the period of the
common-law Rule, and the period of the common-law Rule remains
what it always was, or (b) because Smith was premised on the rule
against restraints on alienation, and the new legislation is directed at
the Rule Against Perpetuities; (2) hold that the USRAP (not the
nondonative transfers legislation) applies, (a) because it replaces the
common-law period with a new legislative equivalent of ninety
years, 1 3 or (b) because ninety years is a much simpler and clearer rule
than common-law measuring lives; (3) hold that the nondonative
transfers legislation (and not the USRAP) applies, since it is directed
specifically at the permissible time period for options and preemp-
tions;234 or (4) the courts might realize that they erred in importing
perpetuities concepts into the cases, and the rule should be a simple
contracts principle that the parties must have contemplated a reason-
able time, which would vary according to the facts of each contract.2 35
231. Id. at 728. The court found that the plaintiffs had a valid right of first refusal until
1996, twenty-one years after the creation of the right.
232. Id. Judge Mumaghan's opinion also considered but rejected a number of other
approaches to validating the right of first refusal: (a) construing the right as a series of
annual options, valid for the first twenty-one options and invalid thereafter; (b) reading in
some measuring lives, since they do not have to be specified in the creating instrument; (c)
construing the right as two options, the first exercisable for twenty-one years (valid) and
the second exercisable for infinity thereafter (invalid); (d) applying the doctrine of cy pres
to cut the unlimited and invalid right down to a valid period; (e) construing the right as a
vested interest (the preemption) in a contingent interest (the first refusal), i.e., as similar to
a vested interest in a contingent remainder; (f) restricting the right to a reasonable time,
which would vary with the circumstances rather'than always being twenty-one years; (g)
holding that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to interests unknown to the
common law; and (h) holding that the Rule does not apply to commercial interests (a cable
TV contract) or to personal property (stock options). Id. at 724-27. For another approach
to validity, see Justice Meyer's dissenting opinion in Village of Pinehurst v. Regional Invs.
of Moore, Inc., 330 N.C. 725, 731-38 412 S.E.2d 645, 648-52 (Meyer, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 331 N.C. 292, 417 S.E.2d 71 (1992). See.supra notes 202-206 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Village of Pinehurst.
233. N.C. GEN STAT. § 41-15 (Supp. 1995).
234. Id § 41-29.
235. Cf Juliano & Sons v. Chevron, U.S.A., 593 A.2d 814 (1991) (holding that New
Jersey's adoption of the USRAP had the effect of abolishing the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities as it applied to nondonative transfers).
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The clear legislative intent is for section 41-29 to apply. The Gen-
eral Assembly has replaced the common-law period with ninety- and
thirty-year (and in some cases sixty-year) periods tailored to donative
and nondonative transfers. The USRAP excludes nondonative trans-
fers from its ambit,2 36 and the new sections 41-28 to 41-33 provide a
comprehensive legislative plan regulating the duration of nondonative
transfers. The time limits of the nondonative transfers legislation nec-
essarily reflect restraints on alienation as well as perpetuities consider-
ations. New sections 41-28 to 41-33 deal specifically with time limits
on options in gross and other interests in land and is so entitled. The
legislation provides statutory definitions for options in gross and
preemptions.237 The approach of sections 41-28 to 41-33 is the prefer-
able policy, providing a reasonable, certain, easily-administered pe-
riod of thirty years238 in lieu of an ill-suited (lives in being plus twenty-
one years) or an unpredictable (a reasonable time) period. To the
property lawyer, certainty is essential to good planning. The intent of
the drafters was that the time limits in Article 3 would supersede any
common-law perpetuities or restraints on alienation inquiries; the
drafting committee considered Smith and its progeny and intended to
simplify and clarify the law.239
Assuming the above reasoning is persuasive to the courts, the
governing time limit on a preemptive right such as the one in Smith
and a right of first refusal such as the one in Village of Pinehurst would
be the thirty-year period established by North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 41-29. As to duration, the preemption would be good for
thirty years, and if not exercised within that period, it would cease to
be valid.240 Of course, the preemption might be invalid for a reason
other than duration if, for example, it failed to provide a mechanism
for determining a reasonable price as in Levan v. Eidson.241 A pre-
emptive right limited to the life of the grantee, like the one upheld in
Nichols v. Lake Toxaway Co.,242 would have to be exercised within
thirty years to be valid. Any option or preemptive right created under
the new law must be exercised within thirty years, at which time it will
236. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
237. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 41-28(2), (3) (Supp. 1995).
238. See id. § 41-29. The duration is extended to sixty years for possibilities of reverter,
rights of entry, and executory interests, which are often found in association with charita-
ble gifts. See id. § 41-32.
239. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1-3.
240. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-29 (Supp. 1995). Under §§ 41-33 and 41-19, the thirty-
year period applies only to interests or arrangements created on or after October 1, 1995.
241. 86 N.C. App. 100, 356 S.E.2d 396 (1987).
242. 98 N.C. App. 313,390 S.E.2d 770, disc review denied, 327 N.C. 141,394 S.E.2d 178
(1990). See supra notes 212-15 for a discussion of the case.
1824 [Vol. 74
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
become invalid. Thus, while the new legislation will generally operate
to validate interests that are not restricted in duration, it will occasion-
ally serve to limit the duration of interests that formerly were valid for
more than thirty (or sixty) years.2 43
In view of the new legislation, what is the status of the Rodin-
Love-Continental Cablevision line of decisions, which implied a con-
tracts law notion of a reasonable time for cases in which no limit was
specified for performance? The USRAP would not apply because of
its exclusion for nondonative transfers. Rodin and Love both involved
interests in land, but the precise conditions at issue-a contract condi-
tioned on rezoning and a right-of-way conditioned on the laying of
railroad tracks-are not specifically dealt with in the new legislation.
There is no general catch-all thirty-year period in the bill, probably
because the range of potential applications might be too broad and
idiosyncratic to predict.
Further, Continental Cablevision involved interests in personal
property rather than land, and it is reasonably clear that sections 41-28
to 41-33 do not apply to personalty.2' An argument exists that the
policies supporting these sections indicate that they should also apply
to interests such as those in Rodin, Love, and Continental Cablevision.
The solution of Rodin-the use of a reasonable period of time when
the contract fails to specify date of performance-has been long-ac-
cepted in the area of commercial transactions involving the sale of
goods and is a general principle used to supply an omitted contract
243. A practitioner has raised the following question: Given that Village of Pinehurst,
discussed supra notes 202-06, seems to say that a right of first refusal unlimited in time
violates the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, and given that the USRAP supersedes
the common-law Rule, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-22 (Supp. 1995), and given that the new judi-
cial reformation power of the USRAP is retroactive, see id. § 41-19(b), does it not then
follow that judicial reformation is now possible for pre-October 1, 1995 rights of first re-
fusal that are unlimited in time?
The authors reject this argument. Under Village of Pinehurst, an unlimited right of
first refusal is not really invalid because it violates the common-law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, but rather (in light of Smith) because it violates the rule against unreasonable re-
straints on alienation (since it is not limited to the time period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities). Thus, the predicate (violation of the common-law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities) for application of § 41-19(b) is missing. Although it might be useful for § 41-19(b) to
apply, the authors' view is that the pre-October 1, 1995 unlimited right of first refusal is
simply invalid under Smith and Village of Pinehurst.
244. The title of the new article refers to interests "in land"; the definitions section for
options, preemptions and nonvested easements refers to "land," see id. § 41-28; the pos-
sibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and executory interest section refers to "events affect-
ing the use of land," see id. § 41-32; and the introductory comment prepared by the UPC
drafters refers to "some transactions respecting land." Id. ch. 41, art. 3 cmt. On the other
hand, the section on leases to commence in the future does not refer to land. See id. § 41-
30. However, the classic situation is a lease to commence upon completion of a building.
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term. 45 If the reach of the new legislation were extended to include
land contract contingencies and personalty as well as realty, the right
of first refusal for the purchase of assets and stocks, which was limited
to twenty-one years by the Fourth Circuit in Continental Cablevi-
sion,2 46 would be given an additional nine years of validity. Likewise,
the performance under the contract for the conveyance of a railroad
right-of-way at issue in Love247 would be extended to thirty years,
rather than the twenty-one year time frame applied by the court as a
reasonable time for performance. In the final analysis, the new legis-
lation does not literally apply to the kinds of arrangements at issue in
Rodin, Love, and Continental Cablevision. Nevertheless, the legisla-
tion's clear rejection of the Smith/Village of Pinehurst perpetuities ap-
proach could be taken as an implicit endorsement of the alternative
reasonable time approach of Rodin for cases not falling within the
letter of the statute.
In another area of the law, tenants' rights (a) to perpetual renew-
als under leases and (b) to options for the purchase of land have been
held not to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities because such inter-
ests do not discourage property enhancement or the alienation of
property.248  For example, in Lattimore v. Fisher's Food Shoppe,
Inc.,249 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that perpetual lease
renewals were not violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities, since
these covenants were included in the tenant's present interest in the
leasehold and did not prevent the alienation of the land at'any time.
25 0
However, the court noted that since such rights are not favored in
property law, they would not be enforced unless the language of the
lease clearly indicated this was the parties' intention.251 The new per-
petuities legislation does not expressly deal with these interests, but
they should continue to be valid under the blanket exclusion from the
245. See U.C.C. §§ 1-204, 2-309(1) (1972) (discussing the use of a reasonable time
where the parties make an isolated contract without specifying time for performance and
there is no evidence of another intention); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRAcrs 18, § 204 cmt. d (1981) (identifying general rules for supplying an omitted contract
term).
246. 873 F.2d 717, 728 (4th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
247. 889 F. Supp. 1548, 1550-51 (E.D.N.C. 1994); see supra notes 225-26 and accompa-
nying text.
248. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 18, at 312.
249. 313 N.C. 467, 329 S.E.2d 346 (1985).




USRAP for "[any] property interest... that was not subject to the
common-law rule against perpetuities.
' 252
One final point in perpetuities law is the charity-to-charity excep-
tion, under which a second gift to a charity will not violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities if the preceding interest is also in a charity, re-
gardless of the vesting or duration of the interest.25 3 The court of ap-
peals addressed the charity exceptions in property law in a case
involving a deed of land to a charity, Hornets Nest Girl Scout Council,
which purported to retain a reversionary interest in the grantor, Can-
non Mills Foundation, another charityl 4 The court held that the in-
terest in the second charity was void, since it was inconsistent with the
other language granting the Girl Scout Council a fee simple.' 55 In
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(7) (Supp. 1995); see also id. § 41-22 (stating that the US-
RAP supersedes the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities).
253. See RESTAATEMENr, supra note 18, § 1.6 (stating that if a charitable gift does not
vest within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, it is void unless the preceding
interest exists in another charity). Comment a of §1.6 explains that this is in consideration
of the public interest inherent in validating and encouraging charitable gifts. Id. §1.6 cmt.
a. This exception is limited to cases involving back-to-back charitable gifts and does not
operate when an individual gift precedes a charitable gift or when a charitable gift precedes
an individual gift. Id §1.6 cmts. b-d.
The charity-to-charity exception is touched upon in the case of In re Perry-Griffin
Foundation, 108 N.C. App. 383, 424 S.E.2d 212, disc review denied, 333 N.C. 538, 429
S.E.2d 561 (1993), which involved a charitable trust conditioned with a restraint forbidding
the sale of any real property, but allowing the lease of such property and the sale of any
timber on such property. Id. at 392, 424 S.E.2d at 217. The plaintiff successfully argued
that these restrictions significantly decreased the value of the property. Id. at 394-96, 424
S.E.2d at 219-20. In the course of its opinion, the court of appeals discussed the preferen-
tial treatment given to charitable gifts in property law as a function of the public policy
supporting such gifts. Id. at 390-91, 424 S.E.2d at 216-17. This discussion recognizes such
proactive intervention as the doctrine of cy pres by which courts reform charitable trusts to
achieve their primary purposes, the exceptions to the Rule Against Perpetuities and rule
against direct restraints on alienation involving charities, and several statutes providing
support for the public policy protecting charitable gifts. Id.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Village of Pinehurst v. Regional Invs. of
Moore, Inc., 330 N.C. 725, 731-38, 412 S.E.2d 645, 648-52 (Meyer, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 331 N.C. 292, 417 S.E.2d 71 (1992) also touched on the charity-to-charity exemp-
tion. The majority held that the exception did not apply because the interest at issue did
not pass to Pinehurst after being vested in another charity nor was the village itself clearly
a charity. Id. at 729, 412 S.E.2d at 647. Justice Meyer relied on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-49
(1991) for an exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities, rationalizing that the purpose of
the interest in Pinehurst was the benefit of the community, an acceptable charitable pur-
pose. Id. at 735,412 S.E.2d at 649 (Meyer, J., dissenting). North Carolina General Statutes
§ 36A-49 provides that no grant to charity shall be invalid by reason of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-49 (1991). The majority opinion rejected section
36A-49 on the ground that the municipality's operation of a sewer system was a proprie-
tary function, not a charitable one. Village of Pinehurst, 330 N.C. at 729, 412 S.E.2d at 647.
254. Hornets Nest Girl Scout Council v. Cannon Found., 79 N.C. App. 187, 339 S.E.2d
26 (1986).
255. Id. at 195, 339 S.E.2d at 32.
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dicta, the court recited several tenets of perpetuities law, including a
statement that the Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to charita-
ble trusts.2 56 In the end, perpetuities was not an issue because the
restraint was not properly included in the deed transferring the prop-
erty and was invalidated by the court on constructional grounds.
Although the USRAP preserves the charity-to-charity exception, 57
the result in Hornets Nest Girl Scout Council would not be changed by
the new legislation, since the case rested on the lack of back-to-back
charitable gifts.
258
IV. A PRIMER FOR THE PRACrITIONER
The 1995 legislation brings new light and clarity to perpetuities-
related law in North Carolina. The changes adopted by the legislature
not only make new law in this area, but integrate many aspects of
traditional Rule Against Perpetuities principles. Although the stat-
utes themselves should be carefully consulted, this Primer outlines the
current status of perpetuities-related law in North Carolina in light of
the new legislation.
A. Sections 41-15 to 41-22: The USRAP
* Interests that are good under the common-law Rule are good under
the USRAP. In other words, the USRAP preserves the validating
side of the common-law Rule. This means that capable practition-
ers do not have to learn anything new.
* Interests that violate the common-law Rule are allowed up to ninety
years to vest or terminate. The USRAP codifies the wait-and-see
doctrine and substitutes a simple ninety-year period in place of the
common-law lives in being plus twenty-one years.
* Remote interests may be judicially reformed. Interests that do not
vest or terminate within ninety years may be reformed by the
court, keeping as nearly as possible to the original plan and within
the ninety-year period. This cy pres power probably will be exer-
cised by the judicial insertion of a saving clause.
256. Id. at 192, 339 S.E.2d at 30 (citing Reynolds Found. v. Trustees of Wake Forest
College, 227 N.C. 500, 42 S.E.2d 910 (1947)). Apparently, the court meant to summarize
the charity-to-charity exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities here since the Rule ap-
plies to gifts to charities when they precede or follow individual gifts. Like Reynolds Foun-
dation, Hornets Nest Girl Scout Council involved a transfer to one charity with an
executory interest in another charity. Id. at 191, 339 S.E.2d at 29.
257. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(5) (Supp. 1995).
258. Note that the charity-to-charity exception generally is available for gifts to govern-
ments and governmental agencies or subdivisions, as well as to charities. Id. § 41-18(5).
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" Drafters probably should continue to use their traditional saving
clauses. They are tailored to each unique family situation and with
increasing longevity of the population may in fact tie up the prop-
erty for more than the USRAP ninety years-if indeed a client
wants to tie up her property for as long as possible.
" Ninety-year saving clauses are an acceptable alternative. Ninety
years may be used in lieu of the common-law lives in being plus
twenty-one years. Ninety years is both simple and certain.
* Drafters should not use a "later-of" saving clause. A saving clause
to take effect on the later of (a) the common-law period, or (b) the
USRAP period of ninety years is very risky. The precise effect of
such a clause is uncertain and should not be used according to sec-
tion 41-15(e) and its Comment.259
" Ninety-year dynasty trusts are now possible. A testator could create
a trust "to pay the income to my descendants from time to time
living for ninety years, and then to pay the principal to my de-
scendants then living per stirpes." This so-called dynasty trust
would be valid under the USRAP. 6 ° In addition to creating new
ninety-year dynasty trusts, it may be possible to convert a trust
initially governed by the common-law period into a ninety-year
trust.
261
259. The explanation is a somewhat tortuous one, having to do with whether use of a
later-of clause would be accepted by the Treasury Department as a valid approximation of
the common-law perpetuities period for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. There
is scholarly criticism of the position taken by the drafters of the USRAP. See Dukeminier,
Ninety Years, supra note 32. The prudent course would be to avoid later-of saving clauses
altogether; the possible gain in tying up the property for a few more years is not worth the
risk of invalidity either for property law purposes or for transfer tax purposes.
260. Note that up to $1 million per transferor ($2 million per married couple) could be
transferred into a dynasty trust and be exempt from federal estate tax and the generation-
skipping transfer tax. See Dukeminier, New Perils, supra note 32, at 205-10. Of course, a
similar trust is possible under the common-law Rule. A testator could create a trust "to
pay the income to my descendants from time to time living until twenty-one years after the
death of the last to die of all my descendants living at my death, and then to pay the
principal to my descendants living at the termination of the trust per stirpes." Neverthe-
less, there may be something about a simple, clear, ninety-year period that is more appeal-
ing to the dynasty-minded than the common law lives plus twenty-one years. Reportedly,
dynasty trusts are already being marketed in USRAP states. See Dukeminier, supra note
99, at 169. But as Jo Ann Harllee of the Trusts Drafting Committee has pointed out, with
the increasing longevity of the population, a dynasty trust keyed to the common-law period
(which trust remains valid under the first principle of the USRAP) would usually tie up the
testator's property for more than ninety years. See supra note 98 and accompanying text
for a discussion of dynasty trusts.
261. This possibility exists where a special power of appointment under a trust
grandfathered from the GST tax (i.e., pre-September 26, 1985 irrevocable trusts and pre-
October 22, 1986 wills and revocable trusts if the decedent died before 1987) is exercised to
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* The USRAP generally applies to property interests and powers of
appointment created on or after October 1, 1995. General princi-
ples of property law determine the time when an interest is
deemed to have been created. 62
* The judicial reformation power (cy pres) is retroactive.2 63 In other
words, fiduciary litigators should be aware that cy pres is now po-
tentially available in perpetuities suits involving pre-October 1,
1995 instruments. This is a significant change in North Carolina
law.
264
* The USRAP provides extensive guidance for determining the valid-
ity of powers of appointment and interests created by the exercise of
powers.265 The traditional tests are used for determining the valid-
ity of powers and interests created by the exercise of powers. If
the power or the interest violates the common-law Rule, the US-
RAP extends its basic ninety-year wait-and-see and judicial refor-
mation protections to them.
* The exercise of a power of appointment created before October 1,
1995 is governed by the USRAP. Furthermore, Professor
Dukeminier has identified two situations in which exercise of a
special power of appointment in a grandfathered trust may lose
the generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption: where the
special power is exercised (1) to extend the trust for the longer of
the common-law period and the USRAP ninety-year period and
extend the trust for ninety years. The considerations are complex, and the drafter should
see Dukeminier, New Perils, supra note 32, for further analysis.
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-16 & cmt., 41-19(a) & cmt. (Supp. 1995). For wills, the
interest is created at the testator's death. Other principles are as follows: for irrevocable
trusts, the creation of the trust; for revocable trusts, the time the trust becomes irrevocable
(usually the settlor's death); and for deeds, the delivery of the deed.
263. Id. § 41-19(b). For judicial proceedings commenced on or after October 1, 1995
but dealing with property interests and powers of appointment created before that date, a
court may reform the disposition in the manner that most closely approximates the trans-
feror's plan and is within the limits of the common-law Rule. Id.
264. While the result of cy pres may be unpredictable, the Official Comment to North
Carolina General Statutes § 41-19(b) urges the court to judicially insert a saving clause into
the instrument, selecting as measuring lives those appropriate to the facts and disposition.
This would "achieve an after-the-fact duplication of a professionally competent product."
Id § 41-19(b) cmt.
The USRAP drafters anticipate that few reformation cases will actually arise under
the ninety-year wait-and-see approach. UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAIN ST PERPETU-
rrias, Prefatory Note (1986). For those cases that do arise, the Official Comment to § 41-
17 provides a number of illustrations and examples. N.C. GEN. STAT. §41-17 cmt. (Supp.
1995). Although the Comment does not specifically mention the saving clause approach, it
seems to be advocated in the Official Comments to §§ 41-15, 41-19(b). See id. §§ 41-15
cmt., 41-17 cmt., 41-19(b) cmt.
265. Id §§ 41-15 to -17.
1830 [Vol. 74
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
(2) to violate the common-law Rule.266 In sum, drafters should be
very careful in exercising special powers under GST-grandfathered
trusts.
* The ninety-year period approach of the USRAP will be accepted as
a valid approximation of the common-law period for Generation-
Skipping Transfer Tax purposes.
267
* The USRAP will not increase malpractice exposure; in fact, it will
significantly decrease malpractice exposure for perpetuities errors.
Most potentially remote interests will in fact vest or terminate
within the ninety-year wait-and-see period. For those that are not
resolved within the ninety-year period, judicial reformation will
minimize any loss to an intended beneficiary.
* The USRAP excludes "nondonative transfers," which roughly
translates to "commercial interests."268 The line between donative
and nondonative transfers is not always easy to draw,269 but North
Carolina General Statutes section 41-18 classifies several types of
transfers, and the Official Comment to section 41-18 provides fur-
266. See Dukeminier, New Perils, supra note 32, at 208-15. There has been a spirited
debate between Professor Dukeminier and the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Pro-
bate Code over whether the GST exemption for pre-1986 trusts will be lost if, in a USRAP
state, the donee exercises a special power in violation of the common-law Rule. In their
prominent, widely adopted trusts and estates casebook, Professors Dukeminier and Johan-
son stated that under these circumstances the trust will lose its GST exemption, because
the exercise makes it unclear whether the interest will vest within the common-law period
or the USRAP ninety-year period, and the Treasury denies the GST exemption where
there is any attempt to achieve the longer of the two periods. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON,
supra note 32, at 895-97. The Joint Editorial Board then issued a statement in response,
characterizing the Dukeminier and Johanson conclusion as "erroneous." Joint Editorial
Board for Uniform Probate Code, Statement in Response to the USRAP "Tax-Trap" Argu-
ment, DONATIVE TRANSFERS, FIDUCIARIES AND ESTATE PLANNING NEWSLETTER (Assoc.
of Am. L. Schs. Section on Donative Transfers, Fiduciaries and Est. Plan., Washington,
D.C.), Spring 1995, at 15-16. The Board stated that the Treasury removes the GST exemp-
tion only if the governing period is measured by the longer of the two periods, and viola-
tion of the common-law Rule only triggers application of the ninety-year USRAP period.
Id. Professors Dukeminier and Johanson responded that the Board was "wrong," because
it had overlooked the alternative contingencies doctrine of the common law. Jesse
Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Response to JEB/UPC by Professors Dukeminier and
Johanson, DONATIVE TRANSFERS, FIDUCIARIES AND ESTATE PLANNING NEWSLETTER (As-
soc. of Am. L. Schs. Section on Donative Transfers, Fiduciaries and Est. Plan., Washington,
D.C.), Fall 1995, at 8-9; see also Dukeminier, New Perils, supra note 32, at 185, 199-202
(providing detailed explanation of the Board's "misstep").
267. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15 cmt. G (Supp. 1995).
268. The choice of term reflects current property usage in the national scholarly litera-
ture. See supra note 106.
269. For example, where does one place a will drawn pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment? Section 41-18(1)(b) provides that such a transfer is not exempt from the statutory
rule. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18 (Supp. 1995).
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ther clarification of the rules for several common nondonative in-
terests in land.27°
The Official Comments to the USRAP are printed in the General
Statutes of North Carolina and provide further guidance.
B. Sections 41-28 to 41-33: Time Limits on Options in Gross and
Other Interests in Land
* Options in gross, preemptive rights, leases to commence in the fu-
ture, and nonvested easements in land are good for thirty years.27'
If the option or preemption is exercised or the lease commences or
the nonvested easement vests within thirty years, it is valid. If the
relevant event does not occur within thirty years, the interest sim-
ply becomes invalid at the end of thirty years.
" Possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and executory interests in
land are good for sixty years.272 If the event causing the property
to revert back to the transferor or to shift over to a third party
does not occur within sixty years, the future interest becomes inva-
lid and the property that was subject to the future interest becomes
a fee simple absolute.
" Section 41-28 provides statutory definitions for options, preemp-
tions, and easements "in gross." 73 In brief, an option is a right to
purchase someone else's land at a specified price. A preemption is
a right of first refusal-i.e., before the owner may sell a parcel of
land to another, the owner must first offer it to the holder of the
preemption. The term "in gross" signifies that the holder of the
option or preemption owns no other interest in the property sub-
ject to the option or preemption or that the holder of the easement
owns no property that would be benefited by the easement. 74
" Drafters should limit the duration of options in gross and similar
interests to thirty years. If the drafter attempts to create an option,
preemption, or nonvested easement in gross, or a lease to com-
mence in the future, with a specified term of more than thirty
270. Id. § 41-18 & cmt..
271. Id. § 41-29.
272. Id. § 41-32.
273. Id. § 41-28.
274. At the suggestion of the General Statutes Commission, the definitions of these
terms, eventually codified as North Carolina General Statutes § 41-28, were added to the
UPC draft on which new Article 3 was based. See Letter from Ronald C. Link, Chair,
Trusts Drafting Committee, to Floyd M. Lewis, Revisor of Statutes (March 22, 1993) (on
file with the authors). These definitions were drawn from various sources, including § 454
of the original Restatement of Property for the definition of nonvested easements in gross.
Id. The meaning of the terms is also discussed in the Comments to North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 41-29 and 41-31. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-29 cmt. & 41-31 cmt. (Supp. 1995).
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years, the interest will be good for only thirty years. If the interest
is not actually exercised within the period, it becomes invalid.7 5
An option in gross or similar interest is good for thirty years even if
the drafter fails to specify its duration.2 7 6 Under North Carolina
275. The authors are not aware of any techniques to circumvent the thirty-year limit,
but undoubtedly creative lawyers will set their wits to finding a loophole. A practitioner
has suggested the following evasive device: The grantor conveys a fee simple determinable
upon the occurrence of an event affecting the use of land. The conveyance provides that
upon the first to occur of: (a) the event or (b) the passage of 591/ years, the property will
automatically revert to the grantor or his heirs. The conveyance further provides that if at
the end of 59'h years the event has not occurred, the grantee may record an extension
document (analogous to re-recording a declaration of restrictive covenants) that will pre-
serve the determinable fee in the grantee for another period until the first to occur of: (a)
the event or (b) the passage of a new 591h years, and so on.
In the authors' opinion, the grantee's right to record would not be legally enforceable
under the new legislation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32 (Supp. 1995). Possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry are valid for a maximum period of sixty years, and the grantee's
right to record, if enforced, would in effect extend the enforceability of the grantor's rever-
sionary interest beyond the sixty-year limit. One could try to validate the grantee's right
on the theory it is analogous to a tenant's perpetual right to renew or a tenant's option to
purchase, see supra notes 248-52, but in contrast to those situations, the proposed right to
record would limit alienability rather than further it. By recording, the grantee would be
losing what would otherwise be a fee simple absolute at the end of 591h years.
Another evasive technique might be to place the right to record an extension docu-
ment in the grantor, not the grantee. In the authors' opinion, that would also be unen-
forceable, because it would amount to a reversionary interest lasting more than sixty years.
One is reminded of the prescient comment in the case that began the evolution of the
common-law Rule:
Now the ultimum quod sit, or the utmost limitation of a fee upon a fee, is not yet
plainly determined, but it will be soon found out, if men shall set their wits on
work to contrive by contingencies, to do that which the law has so long labored
against, the thing will make itself evident, where it is inconvenient, and God for-
bid, but that mischief should be obviated and prevented.
The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 ENG. REP. 931, 953 (Ch. 1682).
A more appropriate instrument for the control of land use by private agreement is the
restrictive covenant. See generally 2 JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL EsTATE
LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 18-3 to -10 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr.
eds., 4th ed. 1994). Restrictive covenants should be regarded as being excluded from the
USRAP by the general exemption for nondonative transfers. There does not seem to be
any North Carolina case law on whether the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
(which is superseded by the USRAP) applies to restrictive covenants (as compared with
options and preemptions). See id The better view is that restrictive covenants are not
subject to the common-law Rule or the USRAP. See RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP-
ERTY (SE~vrrUDES) § 3.3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991); Hess, supra note 32, at 275 n.40.
The duration of restrictive covenants is regulated by the doctrine of changed conditions,
whereby an outmoded covenant becomes unenforceable. WEBSTER, supra, § 18-7. The
North Carolina Conservation and Historic Preservation Agreements Act provides that
conservation and preservation agreements "may be effective perpetually or for shorter
stipulated periods of time." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-38 (1995). They are also excepted from
the re-recording requirements of the Marketable Title Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3(8)(c)
(Supp. 1995).
276. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-29 (Supp. 1995).
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case law predating the enactment of section 41-29, the interest
probably would be void ab initio and the lawyer might be liable for
malpractice.
" An option in gross or similar interest is not automatically valid even
if it is limited to thirty years. From the standpoint of duration, it is
valid. But the interest might fail for some other reason, such as the
rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation or for failure to
provide a mechanism to establish a reasonable price.277
" Drafters should limit ihe duration of possibilities of reverter, rights
of entry, and executory interests to sixty years.278 These interests
are good for sixty years, and any attempt to create them to last
longer than sixty years would be ineffective.
" A possibility of reverter, right of entry, or executory interest is good
for sixty years even if the drafter fails to limit its duration. Under
North Carolina case law prior to the enactment of section 41-32,
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry were regarded as pres-
ently vested in the transferor and therefore were not subject to any
time limit (save for re-recording under the Marketable Title Act).
On the other hand, executory interests (in third parties) were sub-
ject to the Rule Against Perpetuities and were void if not limited
to the period of the Rule.279
" Possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and executory interests
should continue to be re-recorded every thirty years under the Mar-
ketable Title Act. The new legislation does not explicitly address its
relationship to the Marketable Title Act,2 8 0 but the authors' rec-
ommendation is that the possibility of reverter or similar interest
must be re-recorded under the Marketable Title Act every thirty
years in order to retain its validity. Even if adequately re-re-
corded, the interest then becomes invalid at the end of sixty years
under section 41-32.
277. See, e.g., Levan v. Eidson, 86 N.C. App. 100, 356 S.E.2d 396 (1987).
278. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32 (Supp. 1995).
279. The new legislation places the first real limit on possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry. Previously viewed as presently vested and therefore not subject to perpetuities or
other time restraints (as long as they were re-recorded every thirty years), they are now
capped at sixty years. ld. Under the old law, the use of land could be tied up forever by
using possibilities of reverter or rights of entry.
On balance, the statutory reforms both restrict and enlarge the validity of executory
interests. Formerly, executory interests could be created to last longer than sixty years,
provided that the drafter was prescient enough to limit the interest to lives in being plus
twenty-one years. However, executory interests that were not limited to the perpetuities
period were void ab initio. The new law caps express duration at sixty years, while simulta-
neously validating carelessly unlimited executory interests for the same period.
280. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (Supp. 1995).
1834 [Vol. 74
1996] RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 1835
* The new legislation probably does not apply to interests in personal
property.8'
" Sections 41-28 to 41-33 do not apply to all nondonative transfers.
The bill deals with the most common specific types of nondonative
interests in land; it does not provide a general rule for all nondona-
tive interests. Nondonative interests in real property that are not
covered by the new law and nondonative interests in personalty
may be subject to the rule against unreasonable restraints on alien-
ation.282 The USRAP itself exempts nonvested property interests
arising out of nondonative transfers,'28 3 as well as property interests
subjected to time limits by sections 41-28 to 41-33.284
" For interests within their scope, sections 41-28 to 41-33 apply to don-
ative, as well as nondonative transfers.285 While the interests regu-
lated by these sections often will arise under nondonative
transfers, the statute is not restricted to nondonative interests.
" For nondonative interests that are not governed by sections 41-28 to
41-33, but might be subject to some perpetuities challenge, the
drafter should expressly limit duration to the classic period in gross
of twenty-one years. If twenty-one years is not necessary on the
facts, the drafter should consider an even shorter period tailored to
the situation.
* Section 41-33 provides that these sections apply to property interests
created on or after October 1, 1995.286
* The draft Official Comments to the UPC draft, on which sections
41-28 to 41-33 are based, are printed in the General Statutes of
North Carolina and provide further guidance.
281. See supra notes 233-35.
282. The better view regarding North Carolina's inconsistent case law on nondonative
interests is that if the drafter fails to specify a time for performance, the court will imply a
reasonable time, i.e., less than twenty-one years. See, e.g., Rodin v. Merritt, 48 N.C. App.
64, 71,268 S.E.2d 539, 543-44, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 402, 274 S.E.2d 226 (1980), and
motion to reconsider denied, 274 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. 1981). Other authority holds that the
interest will violate the rule against restraints on alienation if the drafter does not specify a
time within the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. See, e.g., Smith v. Mitchell, 301
N.C. 58, 63, 269 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1980) (discussed supra notes 195-201 and accompanying
text).
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-18(1) (Supp. 1995).
284. Id. § 41-18(9).
285. See id. ch. 41, art. 3, cmt.
286. Id. § 41-33.
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C. Sections 36A-145 to 36A-148: Honorary Trusts
" Honorary trusts-those for a lawful noncharitable purpose that lack
a human beneficiary-are generally validated.
287
* Trusts for cemetery lots and the like are specifically validated with-
out regard to remoteness of vesting, provided that they meet the or-
dinary statutory requirements for cemetery trusts.
2 88
* Trusts for pets are specifically validated and guidelines are spelled
out in the statute.
28 9
* The general provision for honorary trusts permits the trustee to
carry out the trust, but the specific provisions for cemetery and pet
trusts apparently require the trustee to carry out the trust. The gen-
eral provisions of section 36A-145 follow the traditional rule that
the trustee of an honorary trust "may" carry it out, but cannot be
compelled to do so. On the other hand, the cemetery trust and pet
trust sections each state that the trust "is valid," suggesting that the
trust is binding on the trustee.
* If the trustee of an honorary trust under section 36A-145 refuses to
carry it out, the trust corpus probably would revert to the settlor or
the settlor's successors on a resulting trust theory.2 9 ° Of course, it is
unlikely that the trustee would refuse to carry out the trust.
" If the trustee of a cemetery trust under section 36A-146 or a pet trust
under section 36A-147 refuses to carry it out, the court probably
would appoint a successor trustee. Since the trust is valid, the usual
rule that equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee
presumably would apply. The court would appoint a successor
trustee, unless it was clear that the settlor intended the trust to be
287. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-145 (1995).
288. ld. § 36A-146. A practitioner has raised the following question about the new
cemetery trusts statute: Must the trustee be the clerk of superior court pursuant to Article
4 of Chapter 65 (especially § 65-7) or a cemetery trustee pursuant to Article 9 of Chapter
65 (especially § 65-60.1)? The authors' interpretation is that the new § 36A-146 is a partic-
ular instance of the new general honorary trusts alternative of § 36A-145, so that the
trustee need not be the clerk (Article 4) or a cemetery trustee (Article 9), provided that
the honorary trust is not a subterfuge to avoid Article 9. In the authors' view, the refer-
ence in § 36A-146 to Articles 4 and 9 was meant to say only that if the cemetery trust falls
under Articles 4 or 9 it must comply with those articles, not to mandate only those forms of
what might be construed as honorary trusts. Thus, a bequest to an individual, say a family
member, to provide for care of a grave should be valid notwithstanding that it does not
meet the technical requirements of Articles 4 or 9.
289. IL § 36A-147.
290. 2A AuSTI-N W. ScoTr, LAW OF TRusTs § 124 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed.
1987). A resulting trust "is simply a way of recognizing the existence of an equitable rever-
sion which has not been expressly provided for. Just as the legal reversion in land is usually
implied rather than expressed, so the equitable reversion [in the trust corpus] is usually
implied." HASKELL, supra note 132, at 352.
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effective only if the named trustee agreed to serve (in which event
the corpus would be returned to the settlor or her successors on a
resulting trust theory).291
" In general, honorary trusts may last for twenty-one years.292 There
is no limit on the duration of cemetery trusts.293 Trusts for pets
terminate on the death of the animal even if the animal lives
longer than twenty-one years.294 Note that the pet trust is re-
stricted to animals in being; for example, it may not extend for the
lives of the animal's offspring born after the creation of the trust.
* Drafters should be aware of alternatives to an honorary trust.
Three classic alternatives are (1) a gift to a person or institution
(e.g., the Humane Society or a church) on the condition that the
donee provide care of a grave or care of a pet or say masses for the
soul; (2) a gift absolute to a person or institution with a clearly
nonbinding expression of the donor's wish that the donee provide
for the grave, pet, or masses; and (3) a contract with a person or
institution to provide care of a grave.
" Honorary trusts terminate if the corpus falls below $100 and are
distributed as provided by the settlor or to the settlor's estate.29 5
* This legislation applies to honorary trusts created on or after Octo-
ber 1, 1995. The cemetery trusts section applies to cemetery trusts
created before, on, or after October 1, 1995.
* The Official Comments to UPC section 2-907, upon which sections
36A-145 to 36A-148 were partially based, are not printed in the
General Statutes, but may be found in the UPC or Uniform Laws
Annotated and provide further guidance.
V. CONCLUSION
Perpetuities reform in North Carolina was commendably imple-
mented during the 1995 legislative session. The new legislation passed
the Senate and the House to become the law of North Carolina effec-
tive generally for interests created on or after October 1, 1995, and in
the case of the USRAP power of judicial reformation, also effective
for pre-October 1, 1995 instruments in litigation commenced on or
after the effective date. The USRAP also applies to pre-October 1,
1995 powers of appointment. The measuring period for retroactive
291. See HASKELL, supra note 132, at 268-69.
292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-145 (1995).
293. Id. § 36A-146.
294. Id. § 36A-147.
295. Id. § 36A-148.
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application of the cy pres power to nonvested interests and powers is
the common-law period, not the USRAP ninety years.
The general perpetuities reform in sections 41-15 to 41-22 reflects
a national trend in which twenty-three other states have adopted the
USRAP. Prior to the USRAP, some states had adopted, by statute or
judicial decision, the cy pres doctrine which allows judicial reforma-
tion of a perpetuities violation. North Carolina had not adopted
mechanisms to deal with the inequities created by strict application of
the Rule Against Perpetuities. Under the USRAP, the passage of ad-
ditional time up to ninety years, as well as the use of judicial reforma-
tion techniques, will usually allow the beneficiaries to receive all or
nearly all of what the testator or settlor intended to give them. The
new legislation's substitution of a ninety-year period for the common-
law lives in being plus twenty-one years, its adoption of the wait-and-
see doctrine, and its grant of judicial reformation power are all new to
North Carolina.
While the USRAP does not adopt the subsidiary doctrine of con-
struction to avoid invalidity, a doctrine that our courts have not con-
sistently approved or disapproved, the USRAP principles will
generally protect any invalid interests chosen by construction. If
North Carolina courts adhere to their occasional view that the Rule
Against Perpetuities does not limit the duration of indestructible
trusts, the USRAP may apply to preserve the trustee's administrative
powers, but will not preserve most distributive powers, leading to judi-
cial reformation.
For powers of appointment, the USRAP treats general testamen-
tary powers like nongeneral (special) powers for purposes of deter-
mining the validity of the power itself as well as the validity of the
interests created by exercise of the power. These are points on which
North Carolina law was not always clear. The broad USRAP judicial
reformation principle is available if our courts do not apply the sec-
ond-look doctrine in determining the validity of interests created by
the exercise of nongeneral or testamentary powers. Our courts have
not clearly recognized the second-look doctrine.
The reforms for options, preemptions, and other typically
nondonative transfers in sections 41-28 to 41-33 were a response to
litigation over the validity of commercial interests in which the draft-
ers had forgotten to place time limits on the interests. While some
policies behind the Rule Against Perpetuities remain valid today, the
period of the Rule and its vesting concept are ill-suited measures for
the validity of nondonative transfers. The application of the common-
law Rule to nondonative transfers by North Carolina courts led to a
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variety of inconsistent decisions and distracted our courts from more
relevant considerations, such as the rule against unreasonable re-
straints on alienation and contracts principles of reasonableness. In
cases involving options and preemptions, Smith erred in adopting the
perpetuities period as the time limit for the rule against restraints on
alienation, and Village of Pinehurst compounded the error by applying
the Rule Against Perpetuities itself, instead of the rule against re-
straints on alienation. Some cases, notably Rodin, have seen the issue
more clearly and employed the contracts law principle of implying a
reasonable time for performance in the absence of a stated period of
performance, but other cases have ignored the approach.
Section 41-29 provides a clear and reasonable thirty-year period
for the performance of options, preemptions, and leases to commence
in the future, as well as for the vesting of nonvested easements. This
period should override the Smith and Pinehurst decisions, but given
the past idiosyncrasies of our courts, one should not be too sanguine
until the courts have spoken again. The thirty-year period is both a
protection for the drafter who forgets to specify a time limit, and a
limitation for the drafter who wishes to specify a time period greater
than thirty years.
Section 41-32 also provides a time limit of sixty years for possibili-
ties of reverter and rights of entry in the grantor. Previously, there
was no time limit on these interests, save for re-recording every thirty
years under the Marketable Title Act, and they could tie up the use of
land forever. The sixty-year limit is also imposed on executory inter-
ests in third parties; previously, there was no time limit on these inter-
ests other than the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. The sixty-
year limit is both a protection for the drafter who forgets to specify a
time limit on executory interests and a limitation for the drafter who
wishes to specify a time period greater than sixty years for executory
interests, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry.
It should be noted that this legislation is not limited to nondona-
tive transfers, although most of the affected interests will arise from
nondonative transfers. It is limited to interests in land, not personalty.
The law does not contain any over-arching general provision; it ap-
plies only to the specific interests described. Nevertheless, one hopes
that in future cases not specifically covered by this legislation the
courts will respond to its implicit message and avoid getting side-
tracked in trying to apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to nondona-
tive transfers; instead, they should focus their attention on considera-
tions of reasonable restraints on alienation, the contracts law principle
of implying a reasonable time for performance, and other relevant
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public policies.2 96 The import of the perpetuities reform is that in
most of these cases, the breaching party should not go free because
the drafter blundered.297
296. A possibly instructive set of policies for consideration is suggested by the draft
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes), rejecting the touch-and-concern require-
ment for the running of servitudes:
Although courts still use the rhetoric of touch and concern, they increasingly
determine the validity of servitudes on the basis of the rules stated in this Chap-
ter. They look to the legitimacy and importance of the purposes to be served by
the servitude in the particular context, the fairness of the arrangement, its impact
on alienability and marketability of the property, its impact on competition, and
the degree in which it interferes with rights to personal autonomy and freedom
from discrimination.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), supra note 275, § 3.2, cmt. b.
297. But See Justice Cardozo's aphorism in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926)










AN ACT TO ENACT THE UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. Chapter 41 of the General Statutes is amended by designat-
ing the existing provisions as Article 1, "Survivorship Rights and Fu-
ture Interests", and by adding a new Article to read:
ARTICLE 2.
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.
§ 41-15. Statutory rule against perpetuities.
(a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless:
(1) When the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate
no later than 21 years after the death of an individual then
alive; or
(2) The interest either vests or terminates within 90 years after its
creation.
(b) A general power of appointment not presently exercisable be-
cause of a condition precedent is invalid unless:
(1) When the power is created, the condition precedent is certain
to be satisfied or become impossible to satisfy no later than
21 years after the death of an individual then alive; or
(2) The condition precedent either is satisfied or becomes impos-
sible to satisfy within 90 years after its creation.
(c) A nongeneral power of appointment or a general testamentary
power of appointment is invalid unless:
(1) When the power is created, it is certain to be irrevocably ex-
ercised or otherwise to terminate no later than 21 years after
the death of an individual then alive; or
(2) The power is irrevocably exercised or otherwise terminates
within 90 years after its creation.
(d) In determining whether a nonvested property interest or a power
of appointment is valid under subdivision (a)(1), (b)(1), or (c)(1) of
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this section, the possibility that a child will be born to an individual
after the individual's death is disregarded.
(e) If, in measuring a period from the creation of a trust or other
property arrangement, language in a governing instrument:
() Seeks to disallow the vesting or termination of any interest or
trust beyond,
(2) Seeks to postpone the vesting or termination of any interest
or trust until, or
(3) Seeks to operate in effect in any similar fashion upon,
the later of (i) the expiration of a period of time not exceeding 21
years after the death of the survivor of specified lives in being at the
creation of the trust or other property arrangement or (ii) the expira-
tion of a period of time that exceeds or might exceed 21 years after
the death of the survivor of lives in being at the creation of the trust or
other property arrangement, that language is inoperative to the extent
it produces a period of time that exceeds 21 years after the death of
the survivor of the specified lives.
§ 41-16. When non-vested property interest or power of appointment
created.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b)and (c) of this section and in
G.S. 41-19(a), the time for creation of a nonvested property interest or
a power of appointment is determined under general principles of
property law.
(b) For purposes of this Article, if there is a person who alone can
exercise a power created by a governing instrument to become the
unqualified beneficial owner of (i) a nonvested property interest or
(ii) a property interest subject to a power of appointment described in
G.S. 41-15(b) or (c), the.nonvested property interest or power of ap-
pointment is created when the power to become the unqualified bene-
ficial owner terminates.
(c) For purposes of this Article, a nonvested property interest or a
power of appointment arising from a transfer of property to a previ-
ously funded trust or other existing property arrangement is created
when the nonvested property interest or power of appointment in the
original contribution was created.
§ 41-17. Reformation.
Upon the petition of an interested person, a court shall reform a dis-
position in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor's
manifested plan of distribution and is within the 90 years allowed by
G.S. 41-15(a)(2),41-15(b)(2), or 41-15(c)(2) if:
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(1) A nonvested property interest or a power of appointment be-
comes invalid under G.S. 41-15;
(2) A class gift is not invalid under G.S. 41-15, but might become
invalid under G.S. 41-15, and the time has arrived when the
share of any class is to take effect in possession or enjoyment;
or
(3) A nonvested property interest that is not validated by G.S.
41-15(a)(1) can vest but not within 90 years after its creation.
§ 41-18. Exclusions from statutory rule against perpetuities.
G.S. 41-15 does not apply to:
(M) A nonvested property interest or a power of appointment
arising out of a nondonative transfer, except a nonvested
property interest or a power of appointment arising out of:
a. A premarital or postmarital agreement;
b. A separation or divorce settlement;
c. A spouse's election;
d. A similar arrangement arising out of a prospective, ex-
isting, or previous marital relationship between the
parties;
e. A contract to make or not to revoke a will or trust;
f. A contract to exercise or not to exercise a power of
appointment;
g. A transfer in satisfaction of a duty of support; or
h. A reciprocal transfer;
(2) A fiduciary's power relating to the administration or manage-
ment of assets, including the power of a fiduciary to sell,
lease, or mortgage property, and the power of a fiduciary to
determine principal and income;
(3) A power to appoint a fiduciary;
(4) A discretionary power of a trustee to distribute principal
before termination of a trust to a beneficiary having an inde-
feasibly vested interest in the income and principal;
(5) A nonvested property interest held by a charity, government,
or governmental agency or subdivision, if the nonvested
property interest is preceded by an interest held by another
charity, government, or governmental agency or subdivision;
(6) A nonvested property interest in or a power of appointment
with respect to a trust or other property arrangement forming
part of a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, health, disabil-
ity, death benefit, income deferral, or other current or de-
ferred benefit plan for one or more employees, independent
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contractors, or their beneficiaries or spouses, to which contri-
butions are made for the purpose of distributing to or for the
benefit of the participants or their beneficiaries or spouses
the property, income, or principal in the trust or other prop-
erty arrangement, except a nonvested property interest or a
power of appointment that is created by an election of a par-
ticipant or a beneficiary or spouse; or
(7 A property interest, power of appointment, or arrangement
that was not subject to the common-law rule against perpetu-
ities or is excluded by another statute of this State.
§ 41-19. Prospective application.
(a) Except as extended by subsection (b) of this section, this Article
applies to a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment
that is created on or after October 1, 1995. For purposes of this section,
a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment is created
when the power is irrevocably exercised or when a revocable exercise
becomes irrevocable.
(b) If a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment was
created prior to October 1, 1995, and is determined in a judicial pro-
ceeding, commenced on or after October 1,1995, to violate this State's
rule against perpetuities as that rule existed before October 1, 1995, a
court upon the petition of an interested person may reform the dispo-
sition in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor's
manifested plan of distribution and is within the limits of the rule
against perpetuities applicable when the nonvested property interest
or power of appointment was created.
§ 41-20. Short title.
This Article may be cited as the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities.
§ 41-21. Uniformity of application and construction.
This Article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
Article among states enacting it.
§ 41-22. Supersession.
This Article supersedes the rule of the common law known as the rule
against perpetuities.
Sec. 2. In the event that the 1995 General Assembly enacts a new
Article of Chapter 36A of the General Statutes, entitled "Honorary
Trusts; Trusts for Pets; Trusts for Cemetery Lots", G.S. 41-18, as en-
acted by this act, is amended by adding a new subdivision to read:
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"(8) A property interest or arrangement subjected to a time limit
under Article 14 of Chapter 36A, 'Honorary Trusts; Trusts for Pets;
Trusts for Cemetery Lots'."
The Revisor of Statutes shall relocate the disjunctive "or" and shall
correct punctuation as appropriate in the event that G.S. 41-18 is
amended as provided in this section.
Sec. 3. In the event that the 1995 General Assembly enacts a new
Article of Chapter 41 of the General Statutes, entitled "Time Limits
on Options in Gross and Certain Other Interests in Land", G.S. 41-18,
as enacted by this act, is amended by adding a new subdivision to
read:
"(9) A property interest or arrangement subjected to a time limit
under Article 3 of this Chapter, 'Time Limits on Options in
Gross and Certain Other Interests in Land'."
The Revisor of Statutes shall relocate the disjunctive "or" and shall
correct punctuation as appropriate in the event that G.S. 41-18 is
amended as provided in this section.
Sec. 4. The Revisor of Statutes shall cause to be printed along with
this act all relevant portions of the Official Commentary to the Uni-
form Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act and all explanatory
comments of the drafters of this act as the Revisor may deem
appropriate.
Sec. 5. This act becomes effective October 1, 1995.
In the General Assembly read three times and ratified this the 7th day
of June, 1995.
1996] 1845
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX II





AN ACT TO PLACE TIME LIMITS ON OPTIONS IN GROSS
AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND, AS RECOMMENDED
BY THE GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. Chapter 41 of the General Statutes is amended by designat-
ing the existing provisions as Article 1, "Survivorship Rights and Fu-
ture Interests", and by adding a new Article to read:
ARTICLE 3.
Time Limits on Options in Gross and Certain Other Interests in Land.
§ 41-28. Definitions.
As used in this Article:
(1) 'Nonvested easement in gross' means a nonvested easement
which is not created to benefit or which does not benefit the
possessor of any tract of land in his or her use of it as the
possessor.
(2) 'Option in gross with respect to an interest in land' means an
option in which the holder of the option does not own any
leasehold or other interest in the land which is the subject of
the option.
() 'Preemptive right in the nature of a right of first refusal in
gross with respect to an interest in land' means a preemptive
right in which the holder of the preemptive right does not
own any leasehold or other interest in the land which is the
subject of the preemptive right.
§ 41-29. Options in gross, etc.
An option in gross with respect to an interest in land or a preemptive
right in the nature of a right of first refusal in gross with respect to an
interest in land becomes invalid if it is not actually exercised within 30
years after its creation. For purposes of this section, the term 'interest
in land' does not include arrangements relating solely to an interest in
oil, gas, or minerals.
§ 41-30. Leases to commence in the future.
A lease to commence at a time certain or upon the occurrence or non-
occurrence of a future event becomes invalid if its term does not actu-
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ally commence in possession within 30 years after its execution. For
purposes of this section, the term 'lease' does not include an oil, gas,
or mineral lease.
§ 41-31. Nonvested easements.
A nonvested easement in gross becomes invalid if it does not actually
vest within 30 years after its creation.
§ 41-32. Possibilities of reverter, etc.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section:
(1) A possibility of reverter preceded by a fee simple
determinable;
(2) A right of entry preceded by a fee simple subject to a condi-
tion subsequent; or
(3) An executory interest preceded by either a fee simple deter-
minable or a fee simple subject to an executory limitation;
becomes invalid, and the preceding fee simple becomes a fee simple
absolute, if the right to vest in possession of the possibility of reverter,
right of entry, or executory interest depends on an event or events
affecting the use of land and if the possibility of reverter, right of en-
try, or executory interest does not actually vest in possession within 60
years after its creation.
(b) This section does not apply to a possibility of reverter, right of
entry, or executory interest held by a charity, a government or govern-
mental agency or subdivision excluded from the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities by G.S. 41-18(5) or to an arrangement re-
lating solely to an interest in oil, gas, or minerals.
§ 41-33. Prospective application.
This Article applies only to a property interest or arrangement that is
created on or after October 1, 1995.
Sec. 2. The Revisor of Statutes shall cause to be printed along with
this act all relevant portions of the Official Commentary to
the Uniform Rule Against Perpetuities Act and all explana-
tory comments of the drafters of this act as the Revisor may
deem appropriate.
Sec. 3. This act becomes effective October 1, 1995.
In the General Assembly read three times and ratified this the 29th
day of July, 1995.
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AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE HONORARY TRUSTS, TRUSTS
FOR PETS, AND TRUSTS FOR CEMETERY LOTS, AS REC-
OMMENDED BY THE GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. Chapter 36A of the General Statutes is amended by ad-
ding a new Article to read:
ARTICLE 14.
Honorary Trusts; Trusts for Pets; Trusts for Cemetery Lots.
§ 36A-145. Honorary trusts.
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a trust (i) for a nonchari-
table corporation or unincorporated society or (ii) for a lawful non-
charitable purpose may be performed by the trustee for 21 years but
no longer, whether or not there is a beneficiary who can seek the
trust's enforcement or termination and whether or not the terms of
the trust contemplate a longer duration.
§ 36A-146. Trusts for cemetery lots.
A trust, contract, or other arrangement to provide for the care of a
cemetery lot, grave, crypt, niche, mausoleum, columbarium, grave
marker, or monument is valid without regard to remoteness of vest-
ing, duration of the arrangement, or lack of definite beneficiaries to
enforce the trust, provided that the trust, contract, or other arrange-
ment meets the requirements of G.S. 28A-19-10, Article 4 of Chapter
65 of the General Statutes, Article 9 of Chapter 65 of the General
Statutes, or other applicable law. This section does not revoke, repeal,
supersede, or diminish G.S. 36A-49.
§ 36A-147. Trusts for Pets.
(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, a trust for the care of one
or more designated domestic or pet animals alive at the time of crea-
tion of the trust is valid.
(b) Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, no
portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of the




(c) The trust terminates at the death of the animal or last surviving
animal. Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended
trust property in the following order:
(1) As directed in the trust instrument;
(2) If the trust was created in a preresiduary clause in the trans-
feror's will or in a codicil to the transferor's will, under the
residuary clause in the transferor's will;
(3) If no taker is produced by the application of subdivision (1)
or (2) of this subsection, to the transferor or the transferor's
heirs determined as of the date of the transferor's death
under Chapter 29 of the General Statutes.
(d) The intended use of the principal or income can be enforced by an
individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument or, if
none, by an individual appointed by the clerk of superior court having
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate upon application to the clerk by
an individual.
(e) Except as ordered by the clerk or required by the trust instru-
ment, no filing, report, registration, periodic accounting, separate
maintenance of funds, appointment, bond, or fee is required by reason
of the existence of the fiduciary relationship of the trustee.
(f) A governing instrument shall be liberally construed to bring the
transfer within this section, to presume against the merely precatory
or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the general
intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence shall be admissible in de-
termining the transferor's intent.
(g) The clerk may reduce the amount of the property transferred, if
the clerk determines that the amount substantially exceeds the
amount required for the intended use. The amount of the reduction, if
any, passes as unexpended trust property under subsection (c) of this
section.
(h) If no trustee is designated or if no designated trustee agrees to
serve or is able to serve, the clerk shall name a trustee. The clerk may
order the transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to
assure that the intended use is carried out and if no successor trustee
is designated in the trust instrument or if no designated successor
trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve. The clerk may also make
such other orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry out
the intent of the transferor and the purpose of this section.
§ 36A-148. Termination of small trusts.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, a trust created
under this Article shall terminate upon the balance of the trust corpus
falling below the sum of one hundred dollars ($100.00), at which time
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the remaining balance shall be disbursed as provided in G.S. 36A-
147(c).
Sec. 2. G.S. 65-9 reads as rewritten:
§ 65-9. Funds to be kept perpetually.
All money placed in the office of the superior court clerk in accord-
ance with this Article shall be held perpetually, or until such time as
the balance of the trust corpus falls below one hundred dollars
($100.00), at which time the trust shall terminate and the clerk shall
disburse the remaining balance as provided in G.S. 36A-147(c). Ex-
cept as otherwise provided herein, no one shall have authority to with-
draw or change the direction of the income on same.
Sec. 3. The Revisor of Statutes shall cause to be printed along with
this act all explanatory comments of the drafters of this act as
the Revisor may deem appropriate.
Sec. 4. This act becomes effective October 1, 1995. Section 1 of this
act applies to trusts created on or after that date. Section 2 of
this act applies to all cemetery trusts in existence before or
created on or after that date.
In the General Assembly read three times and ratified this the 13th
day of June, 1995.
1850 [Vol. 74
